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NARRATIVE HIGHGROUND:
THE FAILURE OF INTERVENTION AS A
PROCEDURAL DEVICE IN AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION LITIGATION
DanielleR. Holleyt

INTRODUCTION

Litigation provides an opportunity for parties to seek legal redress for wrongs, and to define their rights under the law. Litigation also provides a unique forum for the presentation of a party's
story or narrative about a particular issue or set of facts.' The current debate surrounding the consideration of race and ethnicity in

t Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., Yale College;
J.D. Harvard Law School. I would like to thank my family, Peter Spiro, Linda McClain, John
DeWitt Gregory, James Garland, Alafair Burke, and Earl Campbell for their comments, support,
and advice during this project. I would also like to thank Gisella Rivadeneira, Christopher
Fickes, Serge Thony, and Jasinta De La Cruz for their invaluable research assistance.
One commentator has described the role of narrative or storytelling in law as:
Examining law as narrative and rhetoric can mean many different things:
examining the relation between stories and legal arguments and theories;
analyzing the different ways that judges, lawyers, and litigants construct,
shape, and use stories; evaluating why certain stories are problematic at
trial; or analyzing the rhetoric of judicial opinions, to mention just a few
particulars. But as a matter of general outlook, treating law as narrative
and rhetoric means looking at facts more than rules, forms as much as
substance, the language used as much as the idea expressed (indeed, the
language used is seen as a large part of the idea expressed).
Paul Gerwitz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW'S STORIES 3 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gerwitz eds., 1996). See generally Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 307 (1999) (Souter, J.,
dissenting in part) (refusing to discount the narrative force of the witness's story upon the jury);
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) (explaining that trial testimony and evidence tell a story with "descriptive richness," creating a narrative that has the power to support
conclusions and sustain the willingness of the fact finder to draw inferences); Anita F. Hill, The
Scholarly Legacy of A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.: Voice, Storytelling and Narrative, 53 RUTGERS
L. REV. 641, 645-49 (2001) (discussing the frequent use of narratives and stories in the law
through the presentation of witnesses, attorneys' arguments, and the official narrative of a case
presented in judicial opinions); Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHi. L. REV. 737,
738-39 (1997) ("Stories play a big role in the legal process. Plaintiff and defendant in a trial
each tell a story, which is actually a translation of their 'real' story into the narrative and rhetorical forms authorized by law, and the jury chooses the story that it likes better.").
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higher education admissions policies has largely been defined
through litigation.
The stories of the parties in higher education affirmative action 2 litigation are so well known that the average layperson may
be able to describe the plaintiff's claims. 3 The story of the litigation begins when a Caucasian applicant seeks admission to a college or graduate school. 4 The Caucasian applicant is denied admission, but is aware that the college or graduate school has an
affirmative action policy under which the school considers race or
ethnicity in the admissions process. The Caucasian applicant then
files suit against the university and its officers, claiming that the
university's consideration of race in its admissions process is unconstitutional. It is this seemingly straightforward narrative that
has come to define higher education affirmative action litigation.
The second narrative in higher education affirmative action
cases is the narrative of the university defendant. This narrative is
almost as well known as the plaintiff's narrative. The university
2 This Article uses the term "affirmative action" to refer to all university admissions policies that include the explicit consideration of race, ethnicity, or national origin as a factor in the
admissions process. The term "affirmative action" originated in a 1961 Executive Order issued
by President John F. Kennedy requiring government contractors to take "affirmative action" to
prevent discrimination on the basis of "race, creed, color, or national origin" in hiring and employment practices. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450 (1961). This executive order
was superceded by a 1965 Executive Order issued by President Lyndon Johnson that established
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1965).
This order established a nondiscrimination requirement for private firms performing work for
the federal government, and stated that "[tihe contractor will take affirmative action to ensure
that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard
to their, race, creed, color, or national origin." Id.; see also Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic
Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 WM, & MARY L. REV. 1521, 1537 (2003) (discussing the
evolution of the meaning of the term "affirmative action"); William W. Van Alstyn, Affirmative
Actions, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1517, 1527-30 & n. 10 (2000) (tracing the history and evolution of
the term "affirmative action").
3 There is a distinct contrast between the plaintiffs narratives in affirmative action cases,
and the plaintiffs narratives in earlier desegregation cases. In the school desegregation cases,
African-American plaintiffs filed suit to end de jure segregation policies in public schools and
universities. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 438 (1954) (discussing AfricanAmerican plaintiffs who seek desegregation of public elementary and secondary schools);
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (analyzing AfricanAmerican graduate student challenges to a school policy requiring racially segregated facilities);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950) (considering challenge of African-American applicant to University of Texas Law School to state law allowing admission only to Caucasian
applicants).
4 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger (Gratz III), 123 S. Ct. 2411,2417 (2003) (stating that plaintiffs were two white Michigan residents who were denied admission to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts); Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter V), 123 S. Ct.
2325, 2332 (2003) (describing plaintiff Barbara Grutter as a white resident of Michigan who
applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School, and after being denied admission filed suit claiming the Law School's admission policy used race as a predominant factor in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hopwood v. Texas
(Hopwood II), 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996) (describing four plaintiffs as white Texas residents denied admission to University of Texas Law School).
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defendant's narrative centers around a defense of affirmative action on the basis that racial diversity is a compelling governmental
interest, as required under Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause analysis, because racial diversity is integral to the university's educational mission. 5 Its narrative attempts to demonstrate that racial diversity allows different perspectives to be included in classroom discussions, and that producing a racially diverse group of graduates provides benefits to the state, such as professionals who will work in underserved communities. The university defendant's story rarely includes a discussion of the university or state's history of racial discrimination, or any explanation of the connection between the university's current affirmative
action program and the university's past racial discrimination.
The third narrative of the higher education affirmation action
lawsuit is not as well known, and has become marginalized in both
the public and academic debate surrounding these cases. The third
narrative is the story of minority students 6 who are greatly affected, as the direct beneficiaries, of these race-conscious admissions policies.7 The minority students' narrative is introduced into
the litigation through the procedural device of intervention, which

I

See, e.g., Gratz 111, 123 S. Ct. at 1245 (describing the University of Michigan's defense
that race-conscious admissions policies were necessary to create a diverse student body and a
rich educational experience); Grutter V, 123 S. Ct. at 2333-35 (detailing the testimony of the
Law School's witness regarding diversity as a justification for the school's race-conscious admissions policy); Hopwood 1!, 78 F.3d at 941 (stating that the University of Texas Law School
defended its affirmative action admissions policy by claiming that the goal of the program was
to obtain educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse student body).
6 This Article uses the term "minority students" to define the class of intervenors. The
term "minority" is meant to include African-Americans, Native Americans, and Hispanics because these racial and ethnic groups are most often designated as the groups aided by the raceconscious admissions policies addressed herein. Although this Article refers to the intervenors'
narrative as equivalent to the minority student's narrative, some of the intervenors in these cases
include Caucasian students interested in preserving race-conscious admissions policies.
7 See Emma Coleman Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need for itervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 31, 40 (1979) (stating that minorities have a significant interest in protecting affirmative action admissions policies); William
Kidder, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Recent Developments in Litigation, Admissions, and Diversity Research, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 173, 174 (2001) ("Students of color - not university administrators - have the broadest, deepest and most urgent interests in preserving affirmative action.").
One commentator has suggested that the benefit to minority students from affirmative action may have led to the erroneous perception that white applicants are being significantly
harmed by these policies. Goodwin Liu argues that admissions policies that consider race as a
factor may provide minority applicants with a significantly better chance of being admitted, but
that there is no basis to infer that the improved chances of minority applicants means that white
applicants would have a better chance of being admitted in the absence of affirmative action,
because affirmative action may not be the actual cause of the white applicant's rejection. This
"causation fallacy .... erroneously conflates the magnitude of affirmative action's instrumental
benefit to minority applicants, which is large, with the magnitude of its instrumental cost to
white applicants, which is small." Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic
Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1046-49 (2002).
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allows a person or group with an interest in the lawsuit to become
a party even though the existing litigants have not named the person or group as a party. 8
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 24 allows either intervention as a matter of right or permissive intervention. 9 Minority students and public interest organizations have sought to intervene to defend affirmative action admissions policies in every recent higher education affirmative action case,' 0 including the two
recent University of Michigan affirmative action cases, Grutter v.
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger."
Similar to the university defendant, the minority students'
narrative focuses on defending the affirmative action policies. The
minority student intervenors often tell a story about the value of
racial diversity to a university community. However, the minority
students' narrative diverges from the university defendant's in an
important way. It often attempts to connect current affirmative
action policies with the state and/or university's past and current
racially discriminatory policies or practices. 12
This narrative also serves as an alternative viewpoint on the
individualized effects of affirmative action admissions policies.
While the Caucasian plaintiff's narrative attempts to portray individualized harm associated with considering race in admissions,
the minority student intervenors present a narrative of individualized harm associated with admissions programs that do not utilize
affirmative action. 13
3B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.01 (2d ed. 1985); 7C
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1901 (2d

ed. 1986 & Supp. 2003).
9 See infra note 27.
I See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Ga. (Johnson 11), 263 F.3d 1234, 1238 (1 ith
Cir. 2001) (permitting a group of African-American University of Georgia students to intervene); Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter II), 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (reversing the district
court's denial of motion to intervene); Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood I), 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir.
1994) (affirming the district court's denial of motion to intervene); Gratz v. Bollinger (Gratz I),
183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev'd, 188 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1999) (denying motion to
intervene).
I
See Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 396 (holding that minority students and public interest
groups should be allowed to intervene in the litigation).
12 See, e.g., id. at 400 (concluding that the minority students' argument that the university
would be less likely to present evidence of past and current discrimination was persuasive);
Hopwood 1, 21 F.3d at 605 (describing the minority students' argument that their only interest is
preserving affirmative action policies to remedy past discrimination, and that minority students
are in a better position than the university to present evidence of recent discrimination); Peter
Schmidt, Minority Students Win Right to Intervene in Lawsuit Attacking Affirmative Action,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 3, 1999, at A68 (presenting the statement of the lawyer representing the minority student intervenors that "black and other minority students will be able to
bring into the courtroom the truth about continuing inequality and racism and bias in higher
education").
,3 See generally BENJAMIN BAEZ, The Stories We Tell: Law, Race, and Affirmative Ac-
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This Article will argue that despite intervention in higher education affirmative action lawsuits, the minority students' narrative
has been marginalized in these cases. In litigation, one party's
narrative gains central importance or relevance, and becomes reflected in the court's decisionmaking. 14 In higher education affirmative action litigation, the dominant narrative has become that
of the Caucasian plaintiff. This Article will demonstrate that the
marginalization of the minority students' narrative is a direct outgrowth of the minority students' status as intervenors, in that the
court treats intervenors as outsiders in the framework of litigation.
Intervention, a procedure designed to transform bipolar litigation
into a context that affords protection to third parties with substantial interests at stake in the litigation, fails as a procedural device
in these cases.
Part I of this Article will examine and recount the history of
intervenors in higher education affirmative action cases from Regents of the University of California v. Bakke' 5 to the recent
Michigan cases, Grutter and Gratz. In all of these cases, courts at
varying levels have either refused to hear, or have marginalized,
the minority students' narrative. These cases form three different
categories based on the court's recognition or adoption of the minority students' narrative. The first category consists of those
cases in which the minority students' narrative was completely
invisible, because intervention was denied. This category of cases
includes Bakke and Hopwood v. Texas. The second category consists of those cases in which the minority students' narrative is
marginalized. These instances of marginalization occur when minority students become intervenors in the case, but the decisionmaking process largely ignores their arguments, witnesses, and
evidence. This category includes Johnson v. University of Georgia,16 and the two University of Michigan affirmative action cases,
tion, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, HATE SPEECH, AND TENURE: NARRATIVES ABOUT RACE, LAW,

AND THE ACADEMY 95 (2002). Baez identifies a variety of stories that are told by both parties
and courts in the course of affirmative action litigation. Baez argues that the stories told surrounding affirmative action demonstrate how the use of language perpetuates racial hierarchies
and subordination in society. Baez identifies the story of the "impartial rule applier" in affirmative action cases, in which "the neutral, objective, impartial judge ... mechanically applies the
rules of the rational legislature acting in accordance with the will of the people." Id. at 107.
Baez also identifies the story of the "intentional discriminator," in which judges struggle to
construct a story about the role of a party's intention in the antidiscrimination law and affirmative action. Id. at 112-17. For the parties in affirmative action litigation, Baez identifies stories
of the "stigmatized minority," the "innocent white victim," and of "individual merit." Id. at
116-25, 129-39.
'4 See id. at 96 (stating that judges tell stories in order to convince others that their opinions are correct).
'.438 U.S. 265 (1978).
106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
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Grutter and Gratz. The third category consists of those cases in
which the minority students' narrative is given full recognition and
adopted by the court. Up to this point, intervention has failed to
produce any cases that would be included in this third category in
which there is full recognition and incorporation of the minority
student's narrative.
Part II of the Article will examine the failure of intervention
as a procedural device in higher education affirmative action cases.
The relative success or failure of intervention as a procedural device in these cases will be measured on two levels. First, intervention will be measured as a procedural device based on the policy
considerations underlying the rule of intervention. Commentators,
most notably Abraham Chayes, have noted that intervention is one
procedural device that is a marker of public law litigation. 7 Public
law litigation is litigation in which the plaintiff seeks to vindicate
their constitutional or statutory rights in a way that affects more
than the parties themselves.' 8 There are many policy reasons underlying intervention in public law litigation, such as affirmative
action cases. These policy goals include using intervention as a
means of assisting the court in information gathering, judicial
economy, and preventing injury to nonparties.19 On most of these
policy levels, intervention fails in higher education affirmative action cases.
In the specific context of higher education affirmative action
cases, many commentators have argued that intervention is necessary in order to ensure that the courts hear the voices of minority
students. 20 These commentators assume that having the status of
an intervenor is a good unto itself, in that the intervenors have an
opportunity to put forth their arguments before the court. However, if, as in many of the higher education affirmative action
cases, the intervenors' unique story is ignored or unrecognized by
the court, intervention a less effective procedural mechanism.
Part III will argue that the central value of intervention sought
to be fulfilled by the minority student intervenors is the opportunity to present a distinctive narrative to both the courts and the
public, which is not being presented by either the plaintiff or university defendants in affirmative action cases. Intervention efforts,
however, have failed to present a meaningful opportunity for mi17 See, Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1290-91 (1976).
"8 Id. at 1284.
'9 See infra notes 123, 138, and 147.

20

See generally, Jones, supra note 7, at 31; Kidder, supra note 7, at 174.
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nority students to become the central narrative in the continuing
legal debate surrounding affirmative action.
Therefore, Part III proposes that, following the Supreme
Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz, minority students should
abandon further efforts at intervention, and should instead become
plaintiffs in lawsuits to challenge current "race-neutral" admissions standards, such as the Law School Admissions Test
("LSAT"). In the alternative, minority students may choose to
take legislative action through ballot initiatives and other measures
to replace traditional admissions criteria and expand the current
justifications for race-conscious admissions policies. By positioning themselves as plaintiffs, or as the authors of legislative reform,
minority students will be able to realize recognition of their unique
narrative.
I. INTERVENTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION LITIGATION

Intervention is a procedural device intended to enable a party
or group with a substantial interest in the subject of litigation to
become a party in the case to protect their rights.2' Intervention is
often compared to other procedural devices in the federal rules that
recognize that "a lawsuit is often not merely a private fight and
will have implications on those not named as parties. 22 Although
21 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1901, at 228 (stating that intervention is a procedure in which an outsider in a lawsuit becomes a party, even though not named as a party by
the exiting litigants); James Wm.Moore & Edward H. Levi, FederalIntervention L The Right to
Intervene and Reorganization,45 YALE L.J. 565 (1936) (describing intervention as a procedural
device that allows a stranger to the litigation to present a claim or defense in a pending action,
thus becoming a party in the proceeding); Jean M. Radler, When Is Intervention as a Matter of
Right Appropriate Under Rule 24(a)(2) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure in Civil Rights
Action, 132 A.L.R. FED 147 (1996).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 24 was adopted in 1938 in an attempt to codify
existing practice in federal courts at law and in equity. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, §
1903, at 233. Originally the rule allowed for intervention as a matter of right under FRCP
24(a)(3) when a party had an interest that was not adequately represented by the parties. The
rule provided a separate category for intervention as a matter of right under FRCP 24(a)(3)
when a party had an interest that may have been adversely affected by the distribution of property in the court's custody. Id. A substantial amendment to FRCP 24 occurred in 1966, when
these two categories were collapsed into a single provision under 24(a)(2) to allow intervention
as a matter of right when the existing parties fail to adequately represent the intervenor's property interest or other substantial interest. Id. at 234. The 1966 amendment also altered the language of the rule to no longer require that intervenors be third parties that would be bound by
the court's judgment under the principles of res judicata; instead, under the current rule, the
intervenor applicant need only establish that the disposition of the action may "'as a practical
matter' . . . impair or impede" the applicant's ability to protect their interests. Id. at 237.
22WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1901, at228. The other procedural devices that attempt to protect the interests of third parties not initially named in the lawsuit include FRCP 19
(compulsory joinder), and FRCP 23 (class actions). Id. at 228-29; see also Moore & Levi, supra note 16, at 565-67 (comparing intervention to joinder in its use as a procedural mechanism
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intervention does not create a cause of action,23 intervenors have
rights similar to those of parties in the litigation.24 Intervenors
may file motions, participate in discovery, introduce direct testimony, conduct cross-examination, and appeal adverse rulings.2 5
An intervenor's ability to add witnesses and present separate and
sometime conflicting positions on existing issues in the litigation
often leads to the litigation becoming more complex. 26 Due to the
increased burden on the court and the existing parties as a result of
intervention, the rule itself, and courts interpreting the rule, have
standards to determine when a party should be allowed to intervene in a pending action.
FRCP 24 provides for two types of intervention: intervention
as a matter of right and permissive intervention. 27 Under FRCP
24(a), intervention as a matter of right is allowed when a federal
statute confers a right of intervention to the applicant for intervention, or when the applicant is able to demonstrate that they have an
interest in the subject matter of the transaction, and that their ability to protect that interest may be substantially impaired by the
court's disposition of the case.28 The majority of circuits use a
four-part standard to determine whether a party's motion to intervene as a matter of right under FRCP 24(a)(2) should be granted:
(1) timeliness of the filing of the motion; (2) whether the proposed
intervenor claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the litigation; (3) whether the disposition of
the litigation may impair of impede the proposed intervenor' s right
for the protection of third party interests).
23 See Radler, supra note 21, at 147.
24 See Carl Tobias, Intervention After Webster, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 731, 738-39 (1990).
25 Id.
26 Gene

R. Shreve, Questioning Intervention as a Matter of Right - Toward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 894, 903 (1980) (stating that the intervenor may
complicate the original parties' preparation by adding new claims and witnesses).
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 24 states:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene;
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (I) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene;
or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or
executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any
regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive
order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action.
In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of rights of the original parties.
28 Id.
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to protect that interest; and (4) whether the proposed intervenor's
interest is adequately represented by the existing parties.2 9 In recent higher education affirmative action litigation, the applicants
for intervention have sought to intervene as a matter of right by
demonstrating that they had a substantial interest in the university
being allowed to continue to consider race as a factor in admissions, and that their interest was not adequately represented by the
university defendants.
From Bakke to the most recent Michigan cases, courts at varying levels have either refused to hear or have marginalized the minority students' narrative. These cases form three different categories or groups based on the court's recognition or adoption of that
narrative. The first category consists of those cases in which the
minority students' narrative was completely invisible, because intervention was denied. This category of cases would include
Bakke and Hopwood v. Texas. The second category consists of
those cases in which the minority students' narrative is marginalized. These instances of marginalization occur when minority students become intervenors in the case, but the courts, in their decisionmaking process, largely ignore their arguments, witnesses, and
evidence. This category includes Johnson v. University of Georgia, and the two University of Michigan affirmative action cases,
Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. The third category
consists of those cases in which the minority students' narrative is
given full recognition and adopted by the court. Up to this point,
intervention has failed to produce any cases that would be included
in this third category where there is full recognition and incorporation of the minority student's narrative.
A. Invisible Intervenors - Bakke and Hopwood
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 30 a Caucasian applicant, Allen Bakke, was denied admission to the Univer29 See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972) (describing the standard for a federal court to grant intervention as a matter of right under FRCP 24(a)(2)); see also
Reid v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 289 F.3d 1009, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. City of Los
Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2002); Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Sequa, 250 F.3d 171,
176 (2d Cir. 2001); Loyd v. Ala. Dept. of Corrs., 176 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 1999);

Standard Heating & Air Conditioning v. Minneapolis, 137 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1998); Pub.
Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 1998); Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller,
103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997); Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Counties v. Dep't of Interior, 100
F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1996); Mountain Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder,
Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 1995); Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (5th Cir.
1994); Teague v. Barker, 931 F.2d 259, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1991); see generally MOORE, supra
note 8, § 24.03 (describing the development of intervention practice); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 8, § 1907 (describing the intervenor's interest in the subject of the action).
30 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The facts of Bakke have received significant treatment. See Liu,
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sity of California at Davis Medical School. Bakke filed suit
against the Medical School, claiming that the Medical School's
race-conscious admissions policy violated the federal Constitution,
California's state constitution, and Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.3 ' Unlike recent higher education affirmative action
cases, Bakke filed his lawsuit in state court; therefore FRCP 24
was not available for minority students or public interest groups to
seek intervention.3 2 At the trial court level, no intervention was
sought; however, when the case reached the California Supreme
Court, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund requested that the case be
remanded to the trial court "for a new trial with directions to the
trial court to permit the real parties in interest [minority students]
to present evidence on the full range of issues. 33 The California
Supreme Court failed to address this request for a remand, and
thus neither minority34students nor public interest groups became
intervenors in Bakke.
Hopwood v. Texas 35 presents another example of the complete
invisibility of the minority students' narrative in affirmative action
litigation that flows from the denial of a motion to intervene. In
Hopwood, a Caucasian applicant to the University of Texas Law
supra note 8, at 1050-54 (describing the Medical School's admissions policy and Bakke's qualifications).
31Bakke, 438 U.S. at 278-79.
32 See id. at 277 (stating that suit was filed in the Superior Court of California). At the
time Bakke was filed, California did allow intervention entirely at the discretion of the trial
court; however, intervention was not sought at the initial trial proceedings in Bakke. See Jones,
supra note 7, at 34 n.ll (citing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 387 (West 1973)). After Bakke, the
California legislature amended the state's intervention rule to conform with FRCP 24(a). Id.
33 Jones, supra note 7, at 33 n.9 (citing Petition of NAACP for Leave to File as Amicus
Curiae on Petition for Rehearing).
34 The California Supreme Court's lack of response to the NAACP's petition was likely
due to the procedural posture of the case at the time the NAACP sought the equivalent of intervention. At the trial court level the court found in favor of Bakke, holding that the Medical
School's admissions policy violated the federal constitution, state constitution, and Title VI
because the admissions policy operated as a racial quota. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279. The trial
court refused to grant the injunctive relief sought by Bakke on the basis that the Bakke failed to
carry his burden that he would have been admitted to the Medical School but for the existence
of the affirmative action program. Id. The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
holding regarding violation of the federal constitution, and initially ordered remand for a new
trial on the issue of whether Bakke would have been admitted to the Medical School. Id. at 27980. The Medical School filed a petition for rehearing that included a stipulation that the Medical School could not demonstrate that Bakke would have been denied admission absent the
affirmative action program. Id. at 280. After this stipulation was entered the California Supreme Court amended its opinion to provide for an entrance of judgment, instead of a remand
for a trial. Id. at 281. The NAACP's request for a remand for a new trial in which intervenors
could be heard was filed after the Medical School's stipulation, thus when the California Supreme Court reconsidered its remand due to the stipulation there would no longer be a trial in
which intervenors could participate as parties. See Jones, supra note 7, at 33 n.9 (explaining
that the NAACP's request for a remand to allow intervention came after the Medical School's
stipulation, but before the Court's decision on the petition for rehearing).
35 Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood 1), 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994).
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School filed suit against the state of Texas, the Board of Regents
of the Texas State University System, and the University of Texas
Law School, claiming that the Law School's admissions procedures that considered race as a factor were unconstitutional. Two
groups representing minority students, the Thurgood Marshall Legal Society and the Black Pre-Law Association sought to intervene
in the lawsuit.37
The district court denied the motion to intervene, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, finding that the intervenors failed to establish that the Law School would not adequately
represent the intervenors' interests. 38 The Fifth Circuit concluded
that the proposed intervenors failed to demonstrate that the Law
School would not strongly defend its affirmative action policy, or
that the intervenors had a separate defense for the program based
on a past discrimination argument.39
Despite the common goals of the University of Texas Law
School and the minority applicants for intervention to maintain the
race-conscious admissions policy, the minority students presented
a narrative that was far from identical to that of the university.
The proposed intervenors argued that they had an interest in both
maintaining the Law School's then existing admissions policy, and
also in eliminating vestiges of past discrimination. 40 The proposed
intervenors also proffered that race-conscious remedies were necessary responses to the past discriminatory practices of the state
and the university. 41 The proposed intervenors further claimed that
Id. at 604.
17The proposed intervenors sought both intervention as a matter of right under FRCP
24(a), and in the alternative, permissive intervention. The Fifth Circuit utilized the majority
standard for intervention as of right: (I) interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) that
disposition of the action may practically impair or impede the movant's ability to protect that
Ointerest; and (3) that the interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties. Id. at
605 (citing Diaz v. So. Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
878 (1970)).
38 Id. at 605. The Fifth Circuit stated that while the burden for a party to demonstrate inadequate representation is generally "minimal," in cases where the party whose representation is
at issue is a government agency the burden to demonstrate inadequate representation is higher.
Id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1909). This higher burden is due to the presumption that the State represents the interests of all the state citizens. Id. at 605. This presumption
of adequate representation when the government is a party has been criticized by many courts
and commentators. See Katherine Goepp, Presumed Represented: Analyzing Intervention as of
Right When the Government Is a Party, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 131 (2002) (proposing that
there should be no presumption of adequate representation when the government is a party).
39 Hopwood 1,21 F.3d at 605-06.
40 Id. at 605.
41 Id. ("The BPLA and TMLS argue that they have met their burden of showing that their
interests are different from the State's.... Moreover, they argue that because of its competing
goals, the State is not in as good a position to bring in the evidence of present effects of past
discrimination and current discrimination.").
16
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their unique narrative would provide better evidence of the past
discrimination. 42
B. Marginalized Intervenors:Johnson, Grutter, and Gratz
In Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia,43 three Caucasian female plaintiffs filed suit against the
University of Georgia ("UGA") claiming that UGA's 1999 admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and Title IX by
considering race and gender in the admissions process. Shortly
after the lawsuit was filed, a group of African-American UGA students and potential applicants represented by the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund were allowed to intervene in the lawsuit. 44 The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that
UGA's admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause,
Title VI, and Title IX, and specifically finding that creating diversity was not a compelling interest to justify the consideration of
race or gender in the admissions process. 45 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs, but refused to affirm the district court's
holding that diversity was not a compelling interest that would justify UGA's consideration of race as a factor in its admissions policy. 46 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit found that even if creating di-

42 Id.
43 Johnson v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Ga. (Johnson II), 263 F.3d 1234, 1238 (11 th Cir.
2001); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (S.D.
Ga. 2000). UGA's 1999 admissions policy used a three-tiered evaluation system. First, the
university compiled an academic index ("Al") based on a applicant's standardized test scores
and high school GPA. All students with Al scores over a certain designation were admitted.
Those students with an Al score under the automatic admission score, but above a minimum AI
were reclassified and given a Total Student Index ("TSr') ranking. Non-Caucasian applicants,
including Asian Americans, African-Americans, Native Americans, Hispanics, and "multiracial" students were awarded 0.5 additional TSI points. Male applicants were awarded 0.25
points. The university also offered bonus admissions points for students with both parents with
no college education, and all Georgia residents. All applicants with a TSI score of 4.93 or
higher were admitted. Applicants with a TSI score between 4.66 and 4.93 were then evaluated
by "readers" who admitted students based on qualities not evaluated at the other stages of the
admissions process. See Johnson 11,
263 F.3d at 1240-42; Johnson , 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.
44 Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1238.
45 Johnson 1, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-72 (arguing that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
regarding diversity as a compelling interest is not binding precedent, and that post-Bakke affirmative action cases by the Supreme Court do not support the view that diversity is a compelling interest).
46 Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1237 (affirming the district court's determination that UGA's
1999 admission policy was unconstitutional, but not adopting the district court's conclusion that
student body diversity is not a compelling interest sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis
applied to government policies that utilize race as a criteria).
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versity was a compelling interest, UGA's admissions policy was
not narrowly tailored to meet this goal.47
Both the district court and appellate court in Johnson largely
ignored the narrative of the intervenors. The intervenors agreed
with the university defendants that diversity was a compelling interest that would allow the university to consider race in the admissions process. However, they also contended that the consideration of race was necessary to eliminate vestiges of past discrimination. The intervenors argued at summary judgment that
UGA's history of de jure and de facto racial discrimination was
extensive. For UGA's first one hundred sixty years, no AfricanAmerican students were admitted. 48 After African-American students were admitted in 1961, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR")
ordered UGA to submit a desegregation plan and adopt affirmative
action programs to alleviate vestiges of the university's past discrimination.49
The district court only addressed the university's argument
that the admissions policy was justified by the university's desire
to create student body diversity. The district court never acknowledged, in the factual background or legal analysis, the university's
history of overt discrimination towards African-Americans or the
role of affirmative action in alleviating vestiges of past discrimination.5 °
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the past discrimination aspect of the intervenors' narrative directly. While the appellate court acknowledged the intervenors' argument that UGA's
race-conscious admissions policy was necessary to ameliorate the
vestiges of intentional past discrimination, the court claimed that
the intervenors failed to sufficiently raise this issue before the district court. 5' The court acknowledged UGA's past de jure segregation policies, but claimed that the summary judgment evidence on
this point was insufficient.5 2 The appellate court also claimed that
OCR's 1989 lifting of the desegregation order demonstrated that
47Id. at 1244-58 (finding that the court need not resolve the issue of whether student body
diversity is a compelling interest because UGA's system of "mechanically" awarding bonus
points to all applicants of certain racial and ethnic groups was not narrowly tailored to meet the
diversity goal, since applicants were not considered on an individualized basis).
41 Id. at 1239.
49

Id.

5oSee Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-70 (analyzing the UGA admissions policy only
under Bakke and post-Bakke case law regarding diversity as a compelling government interest).
5'Johnson 11, 263 F.3d at 1264 ("Intervenors did not advance [the past discrimination argument] in any meaningful way at the time of summary judgment.").
52Id. (stating that there was little persuasive evidence in the summary judgment record to
support the intervenors' argument that "preferential treatment of all non-white applicants" was
necessary to remedy present effects of past discrimination).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1

affirmative action was no longer necessary to ameliorate vestiges
of past discrimination.53 Further, the court noted that UGA itself
disavowed past discrimination as a justification
for its considera54
tion of race in the admissions process.
In 1997, Caucasian plaintiffs filed two separate lawsuits challenging admissions procedures at the University of Michigan College of Literature, Arts and Science ("LSA") and the University of
Michigan Law School, respectively. 55 In Grutter, the plaintiff,
Barbara Grutter, claimed that the Law School's admissions process
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by considering an applicant's race or ethnicity in the admissions process.56
A group of forty-one individual minority students, and three
pro-affirmative action coalitions applied for intervention in the
Grutter case. 57 The forty-one individual student applicants were
divided into three groups. First, the applicants for intervention
included twenty-one African-American, Latino/a, Caucasian, and
Asian undergraduates from various institutions who asserted that
they intended to apply to the University of Michigan Law
School. 58 The individual applicants also included five AfricanAmerican high school students who intended to apply for admission to LSA and the Law School. 59 The last group of individual
applicants included fifteen African-American, Caucasian, Latino/a,
and Asian graduate students, including twelve Law School students.6 ° Joining the individual intervenor applicants were three
organizations: United for Equality and Affirmative Action, a coalition of the individual intervenors, the parents of the minor applicants for intervention, and other affirmative action supporters; the
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action By Any Means Necessary,
a political action coalition with chapters in California and Michigan; and Law Students for Affirmative Action, a pro-affirmative
51 Id. at 1264-65.
54 Id.
55 Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter V), 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger
(Gratz ii), 122 F. Supp. 2d 811,813 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
56 Grutter V, 123 S. Ct. at 2332; Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter IV), 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6th
Cir. 2002).
57 Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter II), 188 F.3d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1999); Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion to Intervene, Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter I), 16 F. Supp. 2d 797
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-CV-75923-DT) [hereinafter Grutter I Motion to Intervene], available
at http://www.bamn.com/doc/1998/launch-doc.asp?980326-memorandum.asp.
51 Grutter I Motion to Intervene, supra note 54 (setting forth the undergraduate student intervenors who included undergraduates from the University of Michigan, University of California at Berkeley, Wayne State University, and Diablo Valley Community College).
59 Grutter I1, 188 F.3d at 397.
0 Id.

20031
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action organization that organized campus demonstrations in support of affirmative action. 61
The intervenor applicants sought intervention in March
1998.62 The intervenor applicants claimed that they should be allowed to intervene as a matter of right under FRCP 24(a)(2) because the Law School could not adequately represent their interests
in the lawsuit. 63 Specifically, the applicants argued that the Law
School would fail to raise several defenses, including the Law
School's past discriminatory practices and the continuing use of
racially discriminatory admissions criteria such as the LSAT, and
that the Law School would not be able to produce sufficient evidence related to segregation and resegregation of educational institutions.64
The district court initially denied the applicants' motion to intervene as a mater of right. 65 The district court found, similar to
the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood, that the applicants for intervention
failed to establish that they had a different interest from the Law
School defendants, or that the Law School defendants would not
adequately represent the applicants' interest. 66 The court concluded that the applicants for intervention had the same "ultimate
objective" as the Law School defendants: to preserve the current
admissions policy that takes race and ethnicity into consideration. 67
Similarly, the district court in Gratz also denied the intervenor
applicants' motion to intervene. 68 The intervenor applicants in
Gratz included seventeen African-American and Latino/a high
school students who intended to apply or had already applied to
LSA, and one organization, the Citizens for Affirmative Action's
Preservation ("CAAP").69 The district court found that the inter-

61

Grutter I Motion to Intervene, supra note 54.

62

Id.

6- Id. In the alternative, the proposed intervenors also sought permissive intervention as
allowed under FRCP 24(b). Id.
64 Id.
65 Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Intervene, Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter I), 16 F.
Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-CV-75923-DT), available at http://www.umich.edu/
-urel/admissions/legal/grutter/gruord.html.
6

Id.

67 Id. The district court assumed, without deciding, that the intervenor applicants had a
"significant legal interest" in the case and that their ability to protect that interest could be impaired by an adverse finding in the case. The district court relied on the Fifth Circuit's denial of
intervention in Hopwood, and it found that the circumstances of the two cases were "virtually
identical." Id.
" Gratz v. Bollinger (Gratz I), 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev'd, 188 F.3d 394
(6th Cir. 1999).
69Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter II), 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999).
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venor applicants failed two of the requirements for intervention.7 °
The court concluded that the intervenor applicants lacked a substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation, and that the applicants failed to demonstrate that the university defendants inadequately represented their interests.7'
Hearing a consolidated appeal on the intervenor applicants'
motions to intervene in both Gratz and Grutter, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district courts' decisions and held that the intervenor
applicants in both cases met the requirements for intervention under FRCP 24.72 In examining the intervenor applicants' legal interest in the litigation, the court noted that in the Sixth Circuit
there is "a 'rather expansive notion of the interest sufficient to invoke intervention of right.' ' 73 Based on this broad definition of a
substantial legal interest, the Sixth Circuit panel found that the intervenor applicants' interest in maintaining race and ethnicity as a
factor in the admissions process was sufficient to meet the intervention requirements.74 The court described the intervenor applicants' interest as an interest in preserving the numbers of minorities enrolled at LSA and the Law School, and in preserving educational opportunity.75 The court rejected the Gratz district court's
conclusion that a "substantial legal interest" must be a legally enforceable right to have the admissions policy construed.76 Instead
the court noted that the intervenor applicants' "specific interest in
the subject matter of this case, namely their interest in gaining admission to the University," was a direct interest more than sufficient to constitute a "substantial legal interest" under FRCP
24(a).7 7
The intervenors in Grutter and Gratz presented a unique narrative characterized by three aspects: past discrimination, the institutional racism undergirding the use of LSAT scores and GPA as
admissions criteria, and the state's unitary education system. The
first focus of the intervenors' narrative was their emphasis on the
link between race-conscious admissions programs and the univerGratz 1, 183 F.R.D. at 212-16.
Id.
Id. at 396.
73 Id. at 398 (quoting Mich. State
1997)).
74 Id. at 398-99 (explaining that the
posed intervenors to have a "significant
intervenors must have legally enforceable
of the current admissions policy).
75 Id. at 398.
76 Id. at 398-99.
77 Id. at 399.
70

71
72

AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir.
Gratz court erred in finding that in order for the prolegal interest" as required under FRCP 24(a)(2), the
right to have the court determine the constitutionality

2003]

NARRATIVE HIGHGROUND

sity's history of overt racial discrimination.7 8 The intervenors
claimed that a central justification for the current university admissions policies were that the policies serve as a remedy for the past
discrimination. 79 The intervenors argued that the university was
unlikely to raise this defense because it would require the university to highlight its discriminatory practice, possibly subjecting the
university to liability.8 °
Furthermore, the intervenors argued that the University of
Michigan's affirmative action policy was in direct response to civil
rights protests to end racial discrimination by the university. 8' According to the intervenors, African-American students at the University of Michigan organized the Black Action Movement
("BAM") in March 1970 to encourage the university to increase
African-American enrollment. 82 As a result of a strike organized
by BAM, the university announced that it would attempt to meet
the student's demands for increased enrollment through an
affirmative action program. 83 The intervenors also asserted that as
a result of protests by black students in 1975 and 1987, the thenpresident of the university issued a mandate which became the
framework for the current university
admissions policies, includ84
ing the Law School's 1992 policy.
At trial, the intervenors also clarified the past discrimination
aspect of their narrative through trial testimony. 85 The intervenors
presented two witnesses to testify regarding the history of racial
inequality in the United States. Historian John Hope Franklin,
professor emeritus of history at Duke University, testified about
the history of race relations in the United States.86 Professor
Franklin's testimony included a wide-ranging account of racial
hostilities and inequality, including race riots and Jim Crow segre71 See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (containing the intervenors' central argument that their "substantial legal interest" was preserving minority access to learning in light of
the history of overt racial discrimination).
79 Grutter I Motion to Intervene, supra note 54.
90 Id.
85 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.

4 Id.
15 In Grutter,the district court conducted a fifteen-day bench trial in January and February
2001. The district court asked the parties to focus on three issues: "(1) the extent to which race
is a factor in the law school's admissions decision; (2) whether the law school's consideration of
race in making admissions decision constitutes a double standard in which minority and nonminority students are treated differently; and (3) whether the law school may take race into
account to 'level the playing field' between minority and non-minority applicants." Grutter v.
Bollinger (Grutter I1), 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th
Cir. 2002), aff'd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
86 id.
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87

Eric Foner, a leading history professor, also testified
gation.
history of racial oppression and inequality in the
about the general
88
United States.
The second aspect of the Grutter intervenors' narrative was
the emphasis on what the intervenors argued is an inherent racial
bias in the use of standardized testing and GPA as admissions criteria.89 The intervenors argued that the use of the LSAT alone,
without the consideration of race as a factor in admissions, would
lead to the resegregation of most elite institutions of higher education. 90 This resegregation would occur as a result of the "LSAT
gap" that exists between the LSAT scores of minority students and
white students. 9' The intervenors' expert suggested that this gap
existed as a result of cultural bias in the test itself, and the experiences of the test takers that influence their test taking methods.92
The intervenors concluded that in order to fairly evaluate the
LSAT scores of an applicant as a criteria for admission, the Law
for the
School must take race into account in order to account
93
factors.
race-related
by
caused
is
which
gap,"
"LSAT
The final aspect of the Grutter intervenors' narrative was their
focus on the unitary nature of the state educational system. 94 One
17 See Tr. Transr. Vol. 7, 17:23-18:4, 18:8-13, 19:19-20:4 (Jan. 24, 2001), Grutter III (No.
97-CV-75928-DT) (explaining how segregation and inequality in higher learning institutions
shaped his life), available at http://www.ueaa.net/transcript/07-012401 -franklin-rosner.txt.
8 See Tr. Transr. Vol. 10, 226:2-22, 244:4-9, 250:21-251:9, 252:21-253:8 (Feb. 8, 2001),
Grutter III (No. 97-CV-75928-DT), available at http://www.ueaa.net/transcript/10-020801allen-garcia-foner.txt.
89 Defendant-Intervenors' Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 28-36, Grutter III (No.
97-CV-75928-DT) [hereinafter Defendant-Intervenors' Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment], available at http://www.bamn.com/doc/2000/001 I-SJ.pdf.
90 Id. at 29, 31.
11See Tr. Transr. Vol. 11, 140:17-24, 141:8-20, 144:20-24, 145:10-13, 147:14-17 (Feb. 9,
2001), Grutter III (No. 97-CV-75928-DT), available at http://www.vcaa.net/transcript/I I020901 -garcia-white.txt. David White, Director of Testing for the Public, testified regarding the
"LSAT gap" that, "[wihen we looked at the minority students' LSAT scores and compared that
to all their comparable whites from the same school, we found that African Americans had 10
points lower LSAT scores on average than the white students from the same college with the
same grades." Id. at Vol. 11, 144:20-24.
92 Id. at Vol. 11, 155:10-13.
93 Id. at Vol. 11, 159:23-160:3 ("[Race] should be taken into account in evaluating the
LSAT scores of the applicant.... An aspect of evaluating the information is knowing the LSAT
score, and knowing the race of the people who took the LSAT is part and parcel of evaluating
that part of the applicant's file."). The intervenors also argued that the GPA of minority students is negatively affected due to a racially hostile atmosphere on most elite college campuses.
Professor Walter Allen testified that African-American students at predominantly black universities do better than their peers at predominantly white institutions, and this difference is attributed to the racial hostility encountered by African-American students at white institutions. Tr.
Transr. Vol. 9, 88:3-17, 93:10-19, 103:12-17 (Feb. 7, 2001), Grutter III (No. 97-CV-75928DT), available at http://www.ueaa.net/transcript/09-02070 l-james-allen.txt.
14 See Defendant-Intervenors' Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 91, at 30-31 (describing the effect of racial inequality in primary and
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of the continuous themes in the intervenors' arguments and the
testimony offered by them at trial was the notion that the state's
higher education system must be viewed as a continuation of the
elementary and secondary school education offered by the state of
Michigan. 95 The intervenors argued that segregation and inequality in elementary and secondary education is increasing, which is
another cause of the continuing gap between minorities and whites
in standardized tests.9 6 Also, a witness for the intervenors claimed
that the elimination of affirmative action in higher education has a
trickle-down negative impact on elementary and secondary
schools, increasing inequality97and eroding the "overall quality of
public education" in the state.
The district court in Grutter is the only court during the
course of the litigation that addressed the intervenors' narrativeboth their presentation of facts and legal arguments directly. The
Grutter district court held that, under Bakke, creating racial diversity was not a compelling interest such that it would allow the Law
School to consider race as a factor in admissions in a constitutionally permissible manner. 98 After a detailed treatment of the plainsecondary schooling on minority performance in higher education).
95 Id. at 31.
96 Id. at 30. See Defendant-Intervenors' Final Brief at 8-16, Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter
IV), 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1447/01-1516) (arguing that the nation's primary and secondary schools remain largely segregated and these schools "systematically disadvantage black, Latino/a, and Native American students of all social and economic backgrounds"),
available
at
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legalgrutter/gru-fin.
appeal.html.
97 Defendant-Intervenors' Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 91, at 30. Eugene Garcia, Dean of the Graduate School of Education at the
University of California at Berkeley, had testified that in jurisdictions such as California where
affirmative action was eliminated at the university level, the overall quality of education at the
primary and secondary school level declined. Id.
98Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter II), 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd,
288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). The district court also held in the
alternative that even if diversity were a compelling interest, the Law School's admissions policy
was not narrowly tailored to serve this interest. Id. at 850-53. After concluding that the Law
School's admissions policy was not narrowly tailored, the district court found that the individual
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages. Id. at 853. Also, the
court held that the Law School's policy violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and that
the individual defendants could be held liable for monetary damages under Title VI. Id. at 85354. The district court pointed to the policy's use of the term "critical mass" as a goal for the
number of minority students that should be enrolled at the Law School, and determined that
"critical mass" was insufficiently defined to meet the requirements for narrow tailoring. Id. at
850-51.
The court also determined the Law School policy insured the enrollment of a minimum
percentage of minority students, making the policy indistinguishable from a quota. Id. at 49-50.
The district court found that the narrow tailoring criteria were not met due to the policy's lack of
a time limit on the use of race. Id. Finally, the district court concluded that the Law School's
admissions policy failed the narrow tailoring requirement by failing to provide a sufficient reason for considering race only for African-Americans, Native Americans, and Hispanics, and that
the Law School failed to investigate race-neutral methods for creating diversity in enrollment.
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tiffs' and defendants' evidence and legal arguments, the district
court provided a separate analysis of the intervenors' witnesses,
exhibits, and legal arguments. 99
The district court summarized the testimony of each of the intervenors' witnesses, and presented findings of fact and conclusions of law specifically addressing the intervenors' arguments. °°
The district court pointed to the GPA and LSAT gap between Caucasians and the minority groups specified in the Law School's admissions policy, and acknowledged that the reasons for the gap
were "complex."'' ° The court acknowledged that "while one must
be cautious in making generalizations, the evidence at trial clearly
indicates that much of the GPA gap is due to the fact that disproportionate numbers of Native Americans, African Americans, and
Hispanics live and go to school in impoverished areas of the country." 01 2 The court reasoned that even if you accept the intervenors'
factual assertions, the intervenors' arguments fail as a basis for the
Law School's admissions policy because the Supreme Court has
rejected general societal discrimination
as a justification for "race03
conscious decision making."'
In contrast to the district court's detailed, although disparate,
treatment of the intervenors' evidence and legal arguments, the
Sixth Circuit largely ignored the intervenors. Although the Sixth
Circuit found that diversity was a compelling interest in the creation of the Law School's admissions policy,' °4 they never adId. at 851-53. The court argued that other groups beyond the three identified in the admissions
policy had been subjected to discrimination, "such as Arabs and southern and eastern Europeans," but the Law School made no commitment to enroll these students in "meaningful numbers." Id. at 852.
9 Id. at 855-72.
1(M
Id.

Id. at 865.
I01
Id. The district court did not accept all of the intervenors' evidence regarding the GPA
gap. The district court harshly criticized the expert report of Professor Allen, who testified
regarding a study he conducted which showed that minority students at majority undergraduate
institutions face racially hostile environments that inhibit their ability to succeed academically.
Id. at 859-50. The district court concluded that the court was unable "to give any weight to
Professor Allen's study [of the GPA gap], due to the small number of students who participated
in the focus groups and surveys and due to the manner in which the students were selected." Id.
at 865.
13
1 Id. at 869 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)). The district court drew this conclusion without considering the unique context of an educational setting.
The recent Supreme Court cases dismissing general societal discrimination as a justification for
affirmative action were in the government contracts and employment contexts, not education.
Also, the district court failed to distinguish between race-conscious policies based on past discrimination, and policies based on continuing or present racial disparities. The intervenors also
presented evidence of present discrimination specifically in the Michigan public education
system, through the testimony regarding the ongoing racial segregation in secondary and elementary4 schools in Michigan. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
" Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter IV), 288 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that be1)2
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dressed the intervenors' contention that the Law School's admissions policy was justified based on past discrimination. 105 In fact,
the court explained that as a result of their finding that diversity is
a compelling interest, they would not address the intervenors' past
discrimination argument. 0 6 Therefore, after an offer of substantial
trial testimony related to past discrimination, this aspect of the intervenors' narrative was neither addressed nor adopted by the university defendants or the court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's opinion that
the Law School's use of race and ethnicity in its admissions policy
did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 10 7 The Supreme Court found that while the use of race is subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis to assure its compliance with the Fourteenth
Amendment, creating diversity in the law school environment is a
compelling government interest, and the Law School's 1992 policy
was narrowly tailored to meet this goal. 10 8 The majority opinion
completely ignored past discrimination as an alternative justification for the Law School's admission's policy.' °9 In the factual and
procedural history of the case, the majority failed to even acknowledge that the intervenors applied for intervention, and that
after being included in the case, presented thirty hours of testimony at trial.' ' 0
The majority opinion likely ignored the intervenors and their
arguments because of the way the issue was framed for consideration. The Court stated that certiorari was granted "to resolve the
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a question of national importance: Whether diversity is a compelling interest that
can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants
for admission to public universities."''' Also, in the factual and
cause the court was bound by Bakke, the court found that the Law School had a compelling
interest in creating a diverse student body).
105
See id.

1116d. at 739 n.4 ("Because we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in
achieving a diverse student body, we do not address whether the Intervenors' proffered interest
- an interest in remedying past discrimination - is sufficiently compelling for equal protection
purposes.").
107
Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter V), 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
108
Id.
at 2341-42.
""'See id. at 2338-40 (stating that throughout the litigation, the Law School asserted only
one justification for the admissions policy, namely "obtaining 'the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body"').
'""See id. at 2331-35. The intervenors were also denied the opportunity to participate in
oral argument at the Supreme Court.
'"Id.at 2335. Also, the majority opinion in Gratz specifically noted that the Court would
not address a past discrimination justification for the admissions policy because the Law School
itself never offered past discrimination as a reason for adopting the policy. Gratz v. Bollinger
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procedural history of the case, the Court noted that according to
the testimony of Professor Lempert, the Law School's 1992 admission policy was not intended as a remedy to past discrimination,
but was instead intended to bring "a perspective different from that
of members of groups which have not been the victims of such
discrimination."'112
II. THE FAILURE OF INTERVENTION AS A PROCEDURAL DEVICE
A. Failure to Meet Policy Objectives Underlying Intervention

Intervention has failed as a procedural device in the higher
education affirmative action cases. In order to measure the success
or failure of intervention in a particular litigation, it is necessary to
consider the general policy objectives underlying intervention.
Higher education affirmative action cases are a classic example of
what has been called public law litigation. As initially described
by Abraham Chayes, public law litigation is litigation in which the
plaintiff's object is the vindication of constitutional or statutory
policies.113
The traditional conception of adjudication is private law litigation, through which private parties seek to settle a dispute regarding private rights.'" 4 The defining features of private law litigation are a bipolar structure: a dispute that focuses on an identified set of prior events, a lawsuit that is initiated by a private party
and controlled by the private parties, and a judgment that is con(Gratz III), 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2420 n.9 (2003).
112Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2334. The majority opinion, while ignoring the intervenors, did
include the arguments and perspectives of other groups, namely the arguments of amicus curiae
business and military leaders. The majority noted that:
major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints....
What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the
United States military assert that, "[biased on [their] decades of experience," a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential
to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national
security."
Id. at 2340 (internal citations omitted) (citing Briefs of 3M Corp., General Motors Corp., and
Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al.). The majority did not cite the benefits of diversity for minority
students that were outlined by the intervenors in their briefs before the Court.
I13
Chayes, supra note 17, at 1284; see also Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 Wis.
L. REV. 415, 419 (1991) (stating that public law litigation is comprised of lawsuits that vindicate
social values and affect large numbers of people); Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest Groups,
Public Law Litigation,and Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. CHi.L. REV. 279, 279-80 (1990) (arguing
that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the passage of legislation creating statutory
rights and remedies has increased the situations in which courts are called upon to render judgments affecting a large number of persons).
I4 Chayes, supra note 17, at 1282.
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fined to the parties.' 15 In contrast, in public law litigation, the bipolar structure of litigation has given way to suits involving multiple parties, most notably class action litigation." 16 The judges also
engage in what is known as legislative fact finding, in which the
judge will attempt to gather evidence about an entire system, such
as a state's prison system or school system, instead of gathering
facts that pertain just to the named parties in the litigation."7
Also, in public law litigation, remedies are focused not just on the
dispute between the parties, but on remedies that are forward looking and affect large numbers of people in society, such as desegregation orders."18
In public law litigation, public interest groups often seek to
intervene to advocate and protect the rights of third parties that
may be affected by a decision that will define the contours of a
particular statutory or constitutional right." 9 In a common public
law litigation scenario, the government may seek to enforce administrative regulations against an industrial company, and the
Sierra Club, or other environmental public interest organization,
will seek to intervene to protect the interest of citizens whose environmental resources are affected by the alleged Clean Air Act violations. 120 Due to the special role for intervenors in public law liti' 56 Id. at 1282-83.
11 1d. at 1291.

1171d. at 1297 ("In public law litigation, then, factfinding is principally concerned with
'legislative' rather than the 'adjudicative' fact."); Tobias, supra note 108, at 420 ("In institutional reform cases, for example, courts may undertake major responsibility for fact-gathering,
even appointing adjuncts such as special masters, to fulfill what essentially are 'quasilegislative' or 'quasi-administrative' decisional duties.").
118Abraham Chayes explains:
The liability determination is not simply a pronouncement of the legal
consequences of past events, but to some extent a prediction of what is
likely to be in the future. And relief is not a terminal, compensatory
transfer, but an effort to devise a program to contain future consequences in a way that accommodates the range of interests involved.
Chayes, supra note 17, at 1294; see also Tobias, supra note 113, at 419-20 (noting that public
law litigants seek remedies to vindicate rights and interests that are "abstract, ideological, collective or public in character").
''9 Ernest E. Shaver, Intervention in the Public Interest Under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1549, 1558-59 (1988) (noting that public
interest groups seek to intervene to defend policies or legislation consistent with the group's
objectives); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 328-29 (1989) (arguing that the concept of interest under FRCP 24(a)(2)
is important to public interest organizations because they represent large numbers of people who
have interests that may seem individually insubstantial or intangible); Vreeland, supra note 113,
at 283 (noting that public interest groups intervene to represent outsiders in litigation that will
have a broad impact beyond the parties to the case).
120There are numerous examples of public interest groups intervening as a matter of right
under FRCP 24(a). See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming the district court's denial of the ACLU's motion to intervene in a consent decree
between the United States and the city of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police Department, and
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gation, the policy concerns underlying intervention in these suits
are clear.
Four policy reasons are typically given for the presence of intervenors in public law litigation: (1) preventing injury to nonparties; (2) assisting the court in information gathering and providing
expertise; (3) judicial economy; and (4) adding legitimacy to the
court's decision. In examining the role of intervention in public
law litigation, many commentators have identified all or some of
these four policy considerations. 12 1 Courts have also recognized
when deciding whether to allow
these four policy considerations
22
law.1
public
in
intervention

the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners); Clark v. Putnam County, 168 F.3d 458 (11 th
Cir. 1999) (finding that the Georgia State Conference of NAACP Branches had rebutted the
presumption that the named defendants, who had the same objectives in the litigation as the
NAACP, would adequately represent the NAACP's interests, and remanding for consideration
whether the NAACP had standing to intervene as defendants, which the Ninth Circuit noted was
suggestive but not dispositive in determining the intervenor's interest in the controversy); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996) (allowing the North Star Chapter of the Sierra Club
to intervene with other like-minded groups as defendants in an action seeking to keep various
areas in the Voyageurs National Park open to snowmobiles); N.W. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Sierra Club and others forming the Oregon
Natural Resources Council could not intervene in litigation between a timber industry trade
group and the United States Department of Agriculture).
The courts of appeals have put forth various guideposts for public interest groups wishing
to intervene as a matter of right. See, e.g., Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094
(9th Cir. 2002) (stating that even if the federal government defendant discontinues its opposition
to a plaintiffs position and does not appeal any court ruling in a plaintiff's favor, a private party
may still seek intervenor status to take up appeals as intervenor-defendants); United States v.
City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the circuit permits intervention in
consent decrees, even where the consent decree is finalized prior to judicial approval of the
intervention, with the understanding that intervention is not retroactive and intervenors will only
be allowed to participate in post-decree activity); N.W. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82
F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating in dictum that a public interest group has a better chance of
successfully intervening if they were involved in the enactment of the law or administrative
proceeding in question).
It is not only large, well-funded public interest organizations that seek intervention; often
local community groups also seek intervenor status. See, e.g., Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226
F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court's denial of motion to intervene by the
Wilderness Association, a group comprising three local environmental groups and a local resident); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 101 F.3d 503 (7th
Cir. 1996) (denying a group of residents in Bartlett, Illinois, permission to intervene as defendants in litigation relating to the Corps of Engineers denial of a permit to build a waste disposal
facility).
121
See infra note 125, 138, 147, 149 and accompanying text.
122
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter I), 188 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal
citations omitted); Kleisser v. United States Forest Service, 157 F.3d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1998)
(stating policy preference to allow intervention to minimize judicial economy by preventing
collateral attacks); Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d
776, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that intervention is an information gathering technique used
by courts).
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1. PreventingInjuries to Nonparties
The most prominent policy reason underlying intervention is
the need to protect the interest of third parties that are not present
in the lawsuit.12 3 Since the inception of FRCP 24, both courts and
commentators have heralded intervention as an important procedural device to ensure that third parties that may be affected by the
outcome of litigation are given an opportunity to be heard by the
court. 124 In the realm of public law litigation, and specifically affirmative action litigation, intervention was seen as necessary to
allow minority students who would be affected by the outcome of
the litigation an opportunity to be heard by the courts.125 Despite
the objective that intervention will give an outside party a procedural method to protect their interests in the litigation, intervenors
remain outsiders in the litigation.
The tendency to neglect intervening parties is largely explained by the fact that the trial and appellate courts in higher education affirmative action cases, even after intervention, have
treated the litigation as a private (bipolar type) litigation. z6 In
Johnson, Grutter, and Gratz, the courts responded to the litigation
framework established by the original parties to the lawsuit - the
plaintiff and the university defendant. 27 The original parties generally asked the courts to address a single question: Whether under
the Fourteenth Amendment the university is entitled to use race as
a factor in admissions in order to enhance the diversity of the stu12-See John E. Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 Ky.
L.J. 329, 334 (1969) (noting that intervention as a matter of right is permitted to protect the
interest of nonparties); Shaver, supra note 119, at 1570 (1989); Tobias, supra note 119, at 32829 (noting that intervention provides a valuable opportunity for third parties to participate in
litigation that could adversely affect their interests); Vern R. Walker, Note, The Timeliness
Threat to Intervention as a Matter of Right, 89 YALE L.J. 586, 587 (stating that intervention of
right is intended to serve the policy goal of minimizing injustice to nonparties).
24
1 See supra note 119.
5
12 See supra notes 40-42, 93-104 and accompanying text.
26
1 See generally Tobias, supra note 119, at 327-29. Tobias argues that the courts' development of the four considerations for intervention as a matter of right have adversely affected
public interest litigants that seek to intervene. Id. at 327. Tobias explains that the intervention
of right standard reflects a "private law" brand of judicial thinking, and courts continue to apply
the intervention rule public law litigation as if it were private litigation. Id. at 328.
27
1 See Gratz v. Bollinger (Gratz II), 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 n.9 (2003) (refusing to address
the past discrimination rationale because university denied that this was a justification for the
admissions policy); Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter V), 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2334 (2003) (addressing
only the diversity justification and stating that the university never offered past discrimination as
a rationale for its admissions policy); Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter IV), 288 F.3d 732, 739 (6th
Cir. 2002) (stating that the court would only address the issue of whether diversity is a compelling government interest); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Ga. (Johnson I), 263 F.3d 1234,
1264 (1Ilth Cir. 2001) (providing minimal analysis of intervenors' past discrimination rationale);
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1367-70 (S.D. Ga.
2000) (analyzing UGA admissions policy only based on the diversity rationale).
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dent body at the university. As a result, courts have made the diversity justification the central issue in all of these cases. 28
The intervenors attempted to broaden the framework of the
litigation by including additional justifications for the raceconscious admissions program, namely past discrimination and the
discriminatory effects of current admissions criteria. 29 The trial
and appellate courts essentially rejected the intervenors' attempts
to add or contribute additional information outside of the framework set up by the plaintiff and defendant.130 In this way, the court
reacted to the intervenors' arguments in the mode of a private
rights litigation.
This attempt by the trial and appellate courts to limit the
framework or scope of the litigation by ignoring the facts and legal
arguments presented by the intervenors is a displacement of the
balance of interests that should be considered upon a motion to
intervene. The district court considering a motion to intervene
should balance the interests of the original parties and the court in
a streamlined, less-complex litigation, with the interest of the intervenors in offering additional information and legal theories to
enhance the court's ability to make an accurate determination of
the legal and factual issues. 13 1 However, once the court has decided that the interests weigh in favor of allowing intervention, the
court should seek to utilize intervention as a procedural device,
and consider the evidence and legal arguments presented by the
intervenors as a guide and an aid to the court.
The test for intervention as a matter of right under FRCP
24(a) requires that the intervenors be able to demonstrate that the
party on whose side they wish to intervene will not adequately represent their interests. 32 The requirement that an intervenor must
demonstrate inadequate representation is often said to be a minimal burden, but the proposed intervenor must demonstrate that its
'28

See supra note 113.

Final Brief, supra note 96, at 40-43 (stating that racial integration of the schools is a compelling state interest, and affirmative action is the sole means of
continuing racial integration at the University of Michigan Law School).
' 3 "See notes 100-108 and accompanying text; see also Defendant-Intervenors' Final Brief,
supra note 98, at 40 ("The district court never engaged with either side of the fundamentality of
race - not with the students' arguments about racism and meritocracy and not with their arguments for integration, diversity, and progress.").
'.' See Kennedy, supra note 123, at 334 (stating that intervention as a matter of right is a
recognition by the court that the interest of the intervenors and absence of any effective outside
remedy outweighs the interests of the original parties to control their own litigation).
1-2 See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972) (requiring proposed
intervenors to demonstrate that the plaintiff may inadequately represent the interests of the
proposed intervenors); Goepp, supra note 38, at 140 (discussing a special standard for adequate
representation when the government is a party).
129See Defendant-Intervenors'
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interest are not identical to that of the existing parties. 133 Thus,
FRCP 24(a) contemplates and demands that intervenors will bring
a unique perspective to the litigation. Despite this requirement,
courts continually ignore the unique interests that the intervenors
1 34
were required to have in order to gain entry to the litigation.
Essentially, FRCP 24 requires that certain criteria be met for entry
to the litigation, but once inside the litigation, the rules and our
courts offer no answer to the intervenors' interests and concerns.
This lack of symmetry between the entrance requirements and outcome may explain why courts have lowered the standard for intervenors' to demonstrate that their interest is not adequately represented. Perhaps the lower requirements are an acknowledgment by
the courts that, although intervenors are formally allowed into the
litigation, there will be little actual opportunity for them to influence the court's decisionmaking.
A court's lower requirements for intervention, and subsequent
marginalization of the intervenor perspective, is apparent in Grutter. The Sixth Circuit, in overturning the district court's denial of
the intervenor applicant's motion to intervene, points to the relatively low requirements for the intervenors to demonstrate that
they have a substantial interest in the litigation, and that their interest in the litigation would not be adequately represented by the
university defendants. The court stated:
The proposed intervenors must show that they have a substantial interest in the subject matter of this litigation. However, in this circuit we subscribe to a 'rather expansive notion
of the interest sufficient to invoke intervention of right.' For
not have the same standing necexample, an intervenor need
135
essary to initiate a lawsuit.
The court clearly separates the status and role of the intervenor
from those of the plaintiff and defendant.
The courts' awareness that intervenors need not have the same
standing or interests as an actual party to the litigation leads to the
intervenors being largely ignored during the actual decisionmak-

'-',MOORE, supra note 8, § 24.074[4], at 24-70 (arguing that in order to meet the inadequate representation requirement of FRCP 24(a) the proposed intervenors must show that their
interests differ from the parties' interests); Shaver, supra note 119, at 1555 (explaining that in
order to meet the inadequate representation test, proposed intervenors must show that because
their interests conflict with the parties' interest, the parties will not vigorously represent their
interests).
'See

supra Part I.B.

1-'Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter II), 188 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citations
omitted).
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ing. In Grutter, one member of the Sixth Circuit points directly to
the intervenors' status as a reason to ignore their interests.
The Law School's disavowal is why I do not discuss whether
the remediation of past discrimination is a compelling state
interest that could justify the Law School's actions. Not only
must a state interest be compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny,
that motivated the classificabut it also must be the interest
36
tion in the first instance.
Similarly, the Supreme Court majority opinion in Gratz summarily
disposes of the intervenors' narrative, because it was not adopted
by the university.137 These courts' position amounts to a demand
that in the context of Equal Protection analysis, the intervenor's
arguments regarding compelling state interest must be endorsed by
the defendant. This requirement conflicts with the FRCP 24(a)
demand that the intervenors' arguments not be adequately represented by the party on whose side they seek to intervene.
2. Assisting the Court in Information Gatheringand Providing
Expertise
Many commentators and courts have insisted that intervenors
provide valuable assistance to the courts in public law litigation by
providing additional facts and expertise needed to make the complex choices and decisions inherent in public law litigation. 3 8 Intervention, under this theory, operates as a procedural device that
allows courts to gather additional information not provided to them
by the parties, and to receive expert testimony to assist the court in
making and fair and accurate determination of the factual and legal
issues. There may be information that the intervenors have that
'5 Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter IV), 288 F.3d 732, 795 n.17 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting).
137Gratz v. Bullinger (Gratz 1II), 123 S. Ct. 241 I, 2420 n.9 (2003) (stating that to the extent the intervenors' past discrimination argument was never asserted by the university defendant, the argument should be rejected).
13 See Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Effi-

ciency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701 (1977-1978) ("The informational
input of intervenors can help the court's factfinding and law determination and thus enrich the
quality of litigation."); Jones, supra note 7, at 42 (stating that intervention expands the information available to a court attempting to decide the merits of the lawsuit); Shreve, supra note 26, at
909 (1980) (explaining that courts should consider the opportunity intervention provides for the
court to gather additional data and evidence to make possible a more just or accurate decision);
Tobias, supra note 113, at 443 (noting that because the court's decision in public law litigation
will have a broad impact judges will need "a broad range of expertise, information, and perspectives to render the most accurate determinations"); Vreeland, supra note 113, at 300 ("[Intervention] may promote better decisions by ensuring that critical information is available to the court.
The original parties will not always produce the information necessary for just and accurate
results.").
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the parties themselves may be incapable or uninterested in providing to the courts. Under this policy consideration, the intervenor is
similar to an amicus curiae in that they are participating in the
lawsuit to assist the court in its decisionmaking.
Intervention as a procedural device to aid the court in information gathering failed in the recent affirmative action cases. In
Grutter, the district court, Sixth Circuit, and Supreme Court failed
to significantly utilize the information given to the courts by the
intervenors.1 39 The district court was the only court to address the
intervenors' evidence directly.14° However, it failed to incorporate
The district court
the evidence in its decision making process.
approached the intervenors' legal arguments and evidence as a
completely separate and distinct from the original parties' arguments. 142
The district court failed to use the evidence presented by the
intervenors' to aid in its determination of the central issues in the
case: Whether diversity is a compelling government interest, and
whether the Law School's admissions policy was narrowly tailored
to meet this goal. 143 For example, the district court concluded that
the Law School's policy was not narrowly tailored because the
policy failed to explain why the Law School singled out AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, and Native Americans for the policy instead
of groups such as Arabs or southern and eastern Europeans who
had also suffered from discrimination.44 The intervenors provided
testimony that would explain the designation of these groups by
pointing out that all three groups disproportionately reside and attend schools in impoverished areas of the United States. 45 Instead
of using the evidence presented by the intervenors to aid the court
in its decisionmaking, the district court in Grutter elected to separate (segregate) the intervenors' arguments from its central decisionmaking in the case.146 The district court's treatment of the intervenors' arguments signals the court's failure use the intervenors' information as an integrated part of its decisionmaking process.

"1

See supra notes 100-112 and accompanying text.

141 See

supra note 100.
141
See supra notes 101 - 102 and accompanying text.
42
43

See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.

' See Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter II1), 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 842-53 (E.D. Mich. 2001),

rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), affd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
14 Id. at 851-52.
14-Id. at 864.
46

1 See id. at 855-56.
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3. Encouraging Judicial Economy
Another policy goal for intervention is to encourage judicial
economy by consolidating related issues. 147 Similar to arguments
that favor other joinder devices, such as FRCP 19 and the class
action rules of FRCP 23, intervention should allow a court to address all of the facts and legal arguments surrounding an issue to
prevent later litigation of related issues. In the affirmative action
cases, intervention has failed to provide a resolution of the issue
presented by the intervenors, thus leaving open the possibility of
further litigation regarding past discrimination as a justification for
race-conscious admissions policy and48 the alleged discriminatory
effects of current admissions criteria.1
In Grutter and Gratz, the intervenors and district courts expended considerable resources in the presentation of the intervenors' unique factual and legal issues. However, due to the failure
of the appellate court to fully address the intervenors arguments,
those resources were wasted.
4. Adding Legitimacy to Court Decisions
Finally, intervention has also been said to lend legitimacy to
the decisions of courts by allowing third party input in the process
of the litigation.149 In Grutter and Gratz, the decisions of the trial
and appellate courts were questioned by the intervenors, who argued that the courts ignored their input.1 50 In Grutter, the intervenors questioned the district court's willingness to involve the intervenors in its decisionmaking process, stating: "The district court
never engaged with either side of the fundamentality of race - not
with the students' arguments about racism and meritocracy and not
147
Jones, supra note 7, at 42 (stating that intervention allows courts to consolidate related
issues); Shaver, supra note 119, at 1570 (explaining that commentators note that intervention
assists courts in adjudicating disputes more efficiently by combining two or more claims into a
single action).
148
See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
149 See Tobias, supra note 113, at 444 ("In institutional reform, and much additional public
law litigation, citizen participation in the form of intervention might promote governmental
accountability for its decisionmaking and could make both the governmental decision and the
judicial determination more palatable to those who must live with them."); Vreeland, supra note
113, at 300 (stating that judicial decisions that affect widespread interests may be more likely to
be viewed as illegitimate if courts fail to give the public a right to be heard through intervention).
"See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also Jeremy Berkowitz, Student Intervenors Denied Time to Give Oral Arguments to Court, MICH. DAILY, March 11, 2003, at

http://www.michigandaily.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2003/041 I/3e6d7b796ff83?inarchive= I
(noting that the attorney for the Grutter intervenors criticized the Supreme Court's denial of
time for intervenors to participate in oral argument because the Court would be unable to hear
crucial evidence regarding racial bias and inequality in the admissions process).
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with their arguments for integration, diversity, and progress.' 5'
The presence of the intervenors in the recent affirmative action
cases has failed to lend legitimacy to the courts' decisions due to
the courts' failure to sufficiently address the intervenors' evidence
and legal arguments in the decisionmaking of the cases.
B. Intervention in Higher EducationAffirmative Action Litigation
In the specific context of affirmative action higher education
litigation, the predominant argument regarding intervention has
been that minority students have a significant vested interest in
preserving affirmative action admissions programs, and intervention provides the best procedural device for minority students to
protect their interest in affirmative action litigation. 52 In an article
published almost twenty-five years ago, Emma Coleman Jones argued that in affirmative action litigation such as Bakke, no party in
the lawsuit directly represented the interests of minority students
and applicants. 53 Jones argued that intervention is the best procedural device for correcting the absence of minority representation
in higher education affirmative action cases. 154 She suggested that
courts are more likely to uphold affirmative action policies if intervenors participate
in the litigation as a voice for "minority' 55
group interests." 1
More recently, other commentators have identified the goals
of intervention in higher education affirmative action litigation. In
a recent article, Charles Lawrence states that intervenors provide a
valuable critique of the "liberal defense of affirmative action,"
commonly known as the "diversity defense."'' 56 Lawrence argues
that diversity has become the dominant rationale for affirmative
action programs offered by universities and others attempting to

I1 See Defendant-Intervenors' Final Brief, supra note 96, at 40.
112

See Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the

Defense of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 263, 268-69 (1999) (stating that intervention by affirmative action beneficiaries is appropriate in most affirmative action cases, and
that minority students have the only unencumbered interest in defending affirmative action
policies); Jones, supra note 8, at 34 (arguing that minority interest groups should be granted
intervention of right in affirmative action litigation, and that intervention has great potential to
"safeguard" minority interests in defending affirmative action programs); Charles R. Lawrence
III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101

COLUM. L. REV. 928, 967-68 (2001) (asserting that the intervenors in the Michigan affirmative
action cases are an important voice for "transformative politics" - the notion that the goal of
affirmative action should ultimately be to end the subordination of people of color).
3
"1 Jones, supra note 7, at 31.
154Id. at 32 (arguing that intervention is one of the procedural devices available to correct
the absence of minority representation in higher education affirmative action cases).
111Id. at 33.
6

1s

Lawrence, supra note 152, at 931.
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preserve affirmative action. 157 Lawrence further asserts that the
intervenors are attempting to engage in the promotion of "transformative politics" - the notion that in the debate over affirmative
action, beyond the winning and losing of a particular case is the
need to change political consciousness and highlight the need for
the end of racial inequality. 58 He says, "[tihe intervenors have
taken a first important step in that the true victims' voices be heard
and in subverting the legal fiction that only recognizes injury to
the white plaintiffs and makes the University a defender, never a
violator, of minority rights."' 5 9
The intervenors themselves have also identified the roles they
seek to play in these cases. The intervenors view the procedural
process of intervention in higher education affirmative action cases
as a mechanism for promoting the end of racial inequality in society and expanding opportunities for minorities in higher education. 60 In their view, the protection of their interests begins with
voicing their unique perspective or story regarding race-conscious
admissions policies during the course of the litigation. 161
157 Id. ("I argue that as diversity has emerged as the dominant defense of affirmative action
in the university setting, it has pushed other, more radical substantive defenses to the background.").
151Charles Lawrence states:
Transformative politics requires looking beyond winning or losing the
particular legal dispute or political battle and asking how one's actions
serve to reinforce people's awareness of our interdependence and mutual
responsibility as members of the human family ....
The task is to help
the privileged comprehend the profound costs associated with inequality
- the public costs of prisons, crime, illiteracy, disease, and the violence
of an alienated underclass - as well as the personal costs of loneliness
and anomie in a world where no one is responsible for the pain of any
other person.
Id. at 965-66.
59

Id. at 965.
16 Miranda Massie, U-M Students Will Turn Tide in Affirmative Action Fight, DET. FREE

PRESS, Jan. 17, 2001 (quoting the attorney for the Grutter intervenors as stating "student intervenors will give questions of racist inequality, bias and unfairness their proper emphasis. The
pernicious and stultifying myth of race-neutral meritocracy will finally be dispelled"), at
http://www.freep.com/voices/columnists/emassl7-20010117.htm; Katie Plona, MICH. DAILY,
Feb. 6, 1998, at I (quoting the attorney for Citizens for Affirmative Actions Preservation who
explained that the intervenors "have a direct and significant interest in preserving an admissions
policy that broadens access to the University, including the University's authority to consider
how a student's racial background has affected his or her experiences"); Peter Schmidt, Minority Students Win Right to Intervene in Lawsuit Attacking Affirmative Action, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Sept. 3, 1999, at A68 (quoting the attorney for the Grutter and Gratz intervenors, stating
that intervention is necessary because "[i]t has been activism by students - always - that has
been responsible for the expansion of opportunity at the University of Michigan .... It has
never been the university acting on its own").
161See Massie, supra note 160 ("[Tjhe participation of student intervenors in the case gives
us a chance for something more. The trail in the U-M Law School case will change the terms of
the [affirmative action] debate and will correct serious flaws in the approach of recent decisions."); Schmidt, supra note 160, at A68 (quoting the attorney for the intervenors, stating that
intervention "means that black and other minority students will be able to bring into the court-
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As identified by Jones, Lawrence, and the intervenors themselves, the goals of minority students and public interest groups
that seek intervention in these cases are two-fold: interest goals
and narrative goals. The intervenors seek to protect their interests
- namely, successfully defending race-conscious admissions policies. 162 The intervenors also have a narrative goal-to have their
voices heard, and in doing so, to steer the affirmative action admissions debate in courts and in public discourse away from diversity, and instead
towards remedying past discrimination and racial
163
stratification.
The recent higher education affirmative action cases indicate
that intervention is largely failing as a procedural device for providing intervenors a method to meet these two goals of protecting
their interests and meaningfully conveying their unique narrative.
First, in some recent higher education affirmative action cases,
intervention has failed to provide intervenors with a method of
protecting their interest in preserving race-conscious admissions
programs for the purpose of remedying racial inequalities.
In Hopwood, where the Fifth Circuit struck down the raceconscious admissions policy, intervention was denied. 164 In applying the standard for intervention as a matter of right, the district
and appellate courts wrongly equated the university's narrative
with the minority students' narrative, thus finding that the university would adequately represent the proposed intervenors' interests. 65 The Fifth Circuit, in viewing the university's narrative
simply as a story about the defense of a race-conscious admissions
program, assumed that the university would work vigorously not to
be found to have established and promoted an unconstitutional policy.' 66 The Fifth Circuit's initial decision to deny intervention in
the case was later noted by one judge on the Fifth Circuit as a key
error in the court's attempt to render a thoughtful decision on the
merits of the case itself: "As to the request to intervene, what class
of persons is more qualified to adduce the evidence of the present

room the truth about continuing inequality and racism and bias in higher education").
162See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors' Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 89, at 1-3 (urging the court to uphold the Law School's admissions policy).
63
1 See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
164Se supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
165 Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood I), 21 F.3d 603, 606 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The proposed intervenors have not demonstrated that the State will not strongly defend its affirmative action
program.").
'Imd.
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effects of past' 167discrimination than current and prospective black
law students?"

In Johnson and Gratz, although the intervenors were present
in the case, the courts failed to uphold the race-conscious admissions policy. 68 In both of these cases, the Eleventh Circuit and
Supreme Court, respectively, found the admissions policies unconstitutional without a full consideration of the intervenors' primary
contention that the race-conscious policies were justified as remedies for
past discrimination at UGA and the University of Michi69
gan. 1
Intervention has also largely failed to allow the intervenors
meaningful opportunity to meet their narrative goal of having their
voices heard by the courts. This is evident primarily from the fact
that in Johnson, Grutter, and Gratz, the courts refused to fully engage the intervenors' narrative without an endorsement of that narrative by the university defendant. 70 In this way, the courts essentially demand that the intervenors' narrative be the same as the
university defendant's in order for the court to recognize the narrative as one of central relevance or importance.
In Grutter and Gratz, the intervention failed to provide the intervenors with a meaningful opportunity to be heard because the
courts insist that the intervenors' narrative mirror the narrative of
the university defendant. In Grutter, the university refused to put
forth past discrimination as a justification for its admissions policy. 17 1 Instead, the Law School offered a drastically different vision of the advent of its admissions policy. While the intervenors
claimed that the framework for the policy arose from campus pro' 67 Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood 111), 84 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 1996) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I" See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Ga. (Johnson II), 263 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11th
Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court's finding that UGA's race-conscious admissions policy
was unconstitutional); Gratz v. Bollinger (Gratz III), 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003) (holding that
LSA's admissions policy violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
169 See Johnson 11, 263 F.3d at 1264 (dismissing in one paragraph the intervenors' past discrimination contention); Gratz HII,123 S. Ct. at 2420 n.9 (rejecting in a single footnote the intervenors' argument that LSA's programs had a remedial justification).
7
"See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1264 (stating that there was little persuasive evidence in the
record to support a remedial justification, in part because UGA rejected the position that its
policy was motivated by a need to remediate past discrimination); Gratz III, 123 S. Ct. at 2420
n.9 ("The District Court considered and rejected respondent-intervenors' [past discrimination]
arguments .... We agree, and to the extent respondent-intervenors reassert this justification, a
justification the University has never asserted throughout the course of this litigation, we affirm
the District Court's disposition of the issue.").
71See Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter IV), 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2002) ("The Law
School contends that its interest in achieving a diverse student body is compelling ....
The
Intervenors offer an additional justification for the Law School's consideration of race and
ethnicity - remedying past discrimination.").
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tests by African-American students to encourage "educational
equality," the Law School claimed that the admissions policy arose
solely from the Law School's
commitment to enroll students with
72
different perspectives. 1
Also, in contrast to the intervenors' evidence regarding past
discrimination, the Law School offered no testimony regarding
past racial or ethnic discrimination by the Law School or the University of Michigan.173 The Law School instead presented evidence focused solely on diversity as a justification for affirmative
action. 74 The Law School presented the testimony of current and
former University of Michigan professors and administrators to
testify about the pedagogical value of diversity, and the focus of
the admissions policy to admit a diverse class without the use of
quotas.175 The Law School also presented detailed testimony regarding the 1992 admissions policy at issue in the lawsuit. 76 Furthermore, the law school presented an expert witness to statistically substantiate the Law School's claim that
no quota or numeri77
cal goal was used in the admissions policy.
The Law School's refusal to adopt the intervenors' past discrimination analysis may be explained by several factors. First,
the Law School claimed that the faculty committee that conceived
of the policy, and later, the full faculty that adopted the admissions
policy, never considered past discrimination as a justification for
the admissions policy. Instead, as stated in the policy itself, the
Law School claimed that the policy was solely justified by the Law
School's goal "to admit a group of students who individually and
collectively are among the most capable students applying to
American law schools in a given year .... Collectively, we seek a
mix of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who
will respect and learn from each other."'' 78 The Law School policy
172Id. at 737 ("Professor Richard Lempert, the chair of the faculty committee that drafted
the admissions policy, explained that the Law School's commitment to such diversity was not
intended as a remedy for past discrimination, but as a means of including students who may
bring a different perspective to the Law School.").
173
See Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter III), 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829-36 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(giving a detailed recount of witnesses presented by the Law School, all of whom testified regarding admissions procedure or the development of admissions policy to foster a diverse student body).
74

1 See id.

i75See Trial Outline, supra note 87. Lee Bollinger, president of the University of Michigan in 2001, Professor Richard Lempert, then dean of the Law School, and Jeffrey Lehman,
dean of the Law School at the time of trial, all testified on behalf of the University as to the
diversity justification for the Law School's admissions policy.
6

17 See id.
77

1 See id.
'78Grutter III, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (quoting the University of Michigan Law School's
1992 Admissions Policy).
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also specifically indicates an emphasis on racial and ethnic diversity:
There is, however, a commitment to one particular type of
diversity that the school has long had and which should continue. This is a commitment to racial and ethnic diversity
with special reference to the inclusion of students from
groups which have been historically discriminated against,
like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans,
who without this commitment might not be represented in
our student body in meaningful numbers. These students are
particularly likely to have experiences and perspectives of
special importance to our mission. 179
Based on the text of the 1992 admissions policy itself, and the
testimony of the Law School administrators and faculty that developed the policy, there can be little doubt that the goal of maintaining racial and ethnic diversity was a motivating factor in the development of the 1992 admissions policy. However, it is also just
as likely that the Law School began considering race and ethnicity
as factors in its admissions policy as a direct response to both societal discrimination and discrimination by the University of
Michigan itself. As mentioned in the Law School policy, by the
time the 1992 admissions policy was developed, the Law School
"over the past two decades" preceding the 1992 policy was already
making efforts to increase the numbers of certain minority groups
at the Law School. The Law School's use of race and ethnicity as
considerations in admissions traces back to 1966.180 In 1975, the
Law School adopted a formal admissions policy stating that the
Law School should seek to enroll African-Americans, Hispanic
students, and Native Americans as 10-12% of the entering class.
The reason stated for this numerical goal was that "the Law School
recognizes the racial imbalance now existing in the legal profession and the public interest in increasing the number of lawyers
from ethnic and cultural
minorities significantly underrepresented
8
in the profession."' '

icy).

7
1 " Id.

0

at 827-28 (quoting the University of Michigan Law School's 1992 Admissions Pol-

i See id. at 831 n.8. The district court referenced a trial exhibit entitled "The History of
Special Admissions at the University of Michigan Law School, 1966-81." This document recounts the history of the Law School's efforts to enroll minority students. In 1966, the Law
School faculty began to give preference to African-American students and students from "disadvantaged backgrounds" for admissions off the waiting list due to the faculty's concern about
the small numbers of African-American students enrolling at the Law School. Id.
1
1Id. at 830 (quoting the University of Michigan Law School's 1988-89 Law School Announcement).
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The Law School's initial focus on the need to address "racial
imbalance" in the legal profession is much more closely akin to the
argument that race-conscious admissions policies are needed to
cure societal discrimination. Curing racial imbalance is not an attempt to improve the classroom environment or capitalize on different perspectives that may be offered by students of certain racial
and ethnic minority groups. Instead, the Law School was attempting to correct numerical differences in the numbers of minorities
attending the Law School and joining the legal profession. This
original statement of purpose by the Law School resembles the
intervenors' claims that the current consideration of race by the
Law School is necessary to insure that the Law School does not
become "resegregated." In the intervenors' current narrative, and
the previous incarnations of the Law School's admissions policies,
preventing resegregation and ending racial imbalance is a goal
unto itself, separate from creating a racially diverse law school
environment.
Therefore, looking at the Law School's admissions policy
from a broader perspective demonstrates that diversity was not the
only justification for the Law School's use of race in its admissions program. The Law School's abandonment of the past discrimination rationale may be explained by a number of considerations. The Law School, in its litigation strategy, may have concluded that a past discrimination rationale was unlikely to provide
a sufficient basis for the courts to find the use of race met the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. In affirmative action
cases over the last quarter century, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected remedying general societal discrimination as ajustiuse of race in admissions, hiring, and government
fication for the
82
)
contracting.
The courts in Johnson, Grutter, and Gratz also failed to acknowledge another reason that the university defendant would
avoid adopting the intervenors' past discrimination narrative,
the university in past and onnamely because this story implicates
83
discrimination.1
racial
going
The argument can be made, however, that while the intervenors' narrative was never adopted by any of the courts deciding
Grutter or Gratz, aspects of the intervenors' narrative were heard,
because elements of the narrative were interwoven in the Supreme
12See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
'83See Lawrence, supra note 152, at 956 ("Perhaps the University's rejection of the remedial defense can be explained by its concern that by admitting its own discriminatory practices it
would expose itself to liability vis-a-vis minority applicants and students.").
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Court's decisions. Although not attributed to the intervenors, Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Grutter adopts a similar perspective to that of the intervenors' narrative regarding the unitary nature of a state's educational system by highlighting the place of
affirmative action in society's attempt to equalize84 educational opportunity for students of all races and ethnicities.
Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's observation that
''race-conscious programs" must have a "logical end point" will be
more of a consideration over the next generation as society makes
progress towards nondiscrimination and "genuinely equal opportunity." 185 Similar to the arguments made by the intervenors regarding the need for race-conscious solutions to remedy continuing
racial discrimination, Justice Ginsburg noted that currently "conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank discrimination based
on race, remain alive in our land, impeding realization of our highest values and ideals.' 86
Justice Ginsburg also cited statistics that are reflective of the
unitary education aspect of the intervenors' narrative. Justice
Ginsburg recognized that as of 2000-2001, 71.6% of AfricanAmerican children and 76.3% of Hispanic children attended a
school in which minorities made up a majority of the student body,
and that "many minority students encounter markedly inadequate
and unequal educational opportunities.' 8 7 Justice Ginsburg only
connected her evidence regarding segregation and inequality in
elementary and secondary schools with her argument that the time
has not yet arrived to sunset affirmative action programs. Thus,
while Justice Ginsburg did not acknowledge the intervenors' narrative related to current discrimination and the inequality of educational opportunities as a basis for the Law School's affirmative
action, these elements are present in her concurrence, providing
some recognition of the intervenors' perspective.
The intervenors' narrative theme of the inherent unfairness of
the use of LSAT scores as dominant admissions criteria also found
recognition in the dissent of Justice Thomas. 88 Justice Thomas
rejected the majority opinion's conclusion that the Law School's
use of race in admissions leads to educational benefits for all stu-

84See Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter V), 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347-48 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
185Id.

196ld. at 2347-48.
5 7
'
Id. at 2348.
5
1'
See id. at 2360-61 ("The Law School's continued adherence to [the LSAT] it knows
produce[s] racially skewed results is not entitled to deference by this Court.").
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dents. 8 9 Justice Thomas critiqued the concept of selective admissions, stating "there is nothing ancient, honorable, or constitutionally protected about 'selective' admissions."' 90 He argued that law
schools have known that African-American students perform relatively worse on the LSAT than Caucasian students, yet the law
schools continue to use the test as an admissions criteria, and then
consider race to "correct for black underperformance by using racial discrimination in admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic
student body."' 9'
This argument is similar to the one made by the intervenors
regarding the use of the LSAT and GPA. 192 The intervenors argued that the use of the LSAT, without adding the explicit consid93
eration of race, amounts to a racially biased admissions system.
The intervenors also presented testimony that attempted to demonstrate that the LSAT is racially biased. 194 At bottom, much of the
intervenors' questioning of the use of the LSAT and GPA is an
attack on the current system of selective admissions. The intervenors are essentially stating that the current "neutral" selective admissions criteria are unable to stand alone without the consideration of race. 95 Although the intervenors would obviously disagree
with Justice Thomas's conclusion that it is constitutionally impermissible to consider race in admissions, Justice Thomas's dissent
recognizes one of the intervenors' narrative strands that questions
9
11l
d. at 2357. Ironically, although Justice Thomas's critique of admissions criteria mirrored the intervenors' arguments, he failed to acknowledge the arguments of the intervenors in
the portion of his opinion in which he argued that affirmative action programs "stamp minorities
with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude
that they are 'entitled' to preferences." Id. at 2362. The intervenors included minority students
who, as current students at LSA and the Law School, were "beneficiaries" of affirmative action.
None of these students corroborated Justice Thomas's assertion that beneficiaries feel either
entitled or inferior due to affirmative action programs. Justice Thomas failed to acknowledge
the testimony by minority students in Grutter, which disputed his claims of stigma related to
affirmative action.
19 Id. at 2360.
91
1 Id.
192See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
193See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
194
See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
95
'
The Defendant-Intervenors' Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment states:
Because tests such as the SAT and the LSAT measure only a very narrow skill set and correlate poorly with even narrow measures of future
performance, to propose any rigid use of them as tools for distributing
opportunity, rather than as tools for diagnosing educational needs and
designing pedagogical strategies, is illegitimate. Since these tests systematically downgrade the performance of black and other minority students, the suggestion that they should be used in a rigid manner is outrageous - it is a knowing proposal for a racist double standard.
Defendant-Intervenors' Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 91, at 29.
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other aspects of current admissions systems beyond the use of
race.

III.

CLAIMING NARRATIVE HIGHGROUND: ADDRESSING THE
FAILURE OF INTERVENTION AS A PROCEDURAL DEVICE

Intervention has failed as a procedural device in the recent
higher education affirmative action cases. 196 The general policy
goals underlying intervention have not been met in these cases,
and the benefits of intervention said to attach in affirmative action
cases have failed to materialize. 97 For these reasons, minority
students and public interest organizations that have served as intervenors in these cases should abandon intervention as a procedural device in the continuing legal and public debate surrounding
higher education admissions policies.

Several important issues in the area of higher education admissions policies remain unresolved by the Supreme Court's holdings in Grutterand Gratz.198 Grutter and Gratz did not answer the
question of whether public universities may employ raceconscious remedies in order to remedy past segregation.1 99 Also,
the Supreme Court failed to address the Grutterand Gratz intervenors' argument that a public university has an affirmative duty under the Equal Protection Clause to prevent the resegregation that
would result if the university relies primarily on standardized test
scores and GPA as admissions criteria. 200 The recent cases also
did not address whether a race-conscious admission policy may be
justified to remedy ongoing de facto segregation in a state's elementary and secondary school system. 20' Because all of these issues remain unresolved in the area of higher education admissions
policy, minority students and public interest groups committed to
the resolution of these lingering questions must consider alternatives to intervention.

196 See supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.
197See supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.
118See Margaret Graham Tebo, New Frontierfor Affirmative Action, 2 No. 25 A.B.A.J. EREP. 3 (June 27, 2003), WL 2 No. 25 ABAJEREP 3 (stating that while Grutter resolved the
issue of whether diversity is a compelling government interest, many of the questions in the
affirmative action area remain unresolved).
199See Gratz v. Bollinger (Gratz II), 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 n.9 (2003) (stating that the
Court affirmed the district court's rejection of the intervenors' argument that LSA's raceconscious admission program was justified by past discrimination because the University failed
for the program).
to offer
20 past discrimination as a justification
See id.
201 See id; see also Lawrence, supra note 152, at 946 (arguing that establishing "subordinated minority children" as plaintiffs in a recent lawsuit places "the victims of racism at the
center" of the admission debate).
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As one method of reversing systemic racial inequality, minority students and public interest groups advocating race-conscious
admissions policies should consider becoming plaintiffs in lawsuits against public universities to challenge current admissions
policies. 202 While these cases may ultimately prove unsuccessful
on their merits, the position as "plaintiff' will afford a better opportunity to be heard than the opportunity provided through the
procedure of intervention.2 °3 Similar to the litigation strategy
adopted by Caucasian plaintiffs in the affirmative action cases, a
minority student, after being rejected from a state university would
2 °4
file suit against the university challenging its admissions policy.
There is a growing movement among legal scholars and educators that questions the validity of standardized tests as legitimate
admissions criteria.2 °5 Presumably the university's admissions
program at issue in the lawsuit would be primarily based on the
use of standardized tests and GPAs to admit students.20 6 The rejected minority applicant would argue that the use of standardized
testing and GPA as the predominant factor in admissions violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 7 The
202

See Lawrence, supra note 152, at 943-46 (describing a class action suit brought against
the University of California at Berkeley because of admissions policies that relied on GPA and
standardized test scores, as an example of plaintiffs challenging "race-neutral" admissions policies).
203See supra Part H (discussing the failure of intervention to provide a meaningful opportunity2for
the minority students' narrative to be heard).
4
( See sources cited infra note 205.
205Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self-Interest? 10 Reasons Why UCDavis Should Abandon the LSAT (and Why Other Good Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 594-95 (2001) (arguing that standardized testing is primarily a lucrative business for testing corporations instead of a measure for academic success); Erika
Dowdell, Accessing Higher Education as a Multiracial Movement, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 5, 23 n. 15 (2001-02) (noting that according to professor Gerald Torres, researchers
have found that students who would have been rejected for admission if considering only GPA
or standardized tests are outperforming expectations when admitted under admissions policies
that do not consider standardized test scores); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Legal Fiction of
Standardized Testing, 21 LAW & INEQ. J. 397 (2003) (challenging the use of standardized tests
through the narrative of minority students); Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 965 (1996) ("In fact, the
dominance of standardized tests in selection is a relatively recent development. The civil rights
revolution, and the introduction of affirmative action programs, occurred at the same time that
society was formalizing a 'meritocracy' based on education and standardized testing."); Lawrence, supra note 146, at 945 (arguing that the University of California at Berkeley's admissions
procedures rely on standardized tests in a determinative and exclusionary way).
2
06See generally Gratz v. Bollinger (Gratz III), 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2331-32 (2003) (describing LSA's admissions procedure which used a student's GPA and standardized test score to
initially classify all applicants); Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter V), 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2418-20
(2003) (recounting the Law School's admissions policy including the Law School's use of
LSAT2and
GPA as predictors of academic success).
7
0 See Lawrence, supra note 152, at 943-46 (describing a class action suit brought against
the University of California at Berkeley because of admissions policies that relied on GPA and
standardized test scores, as an example of plaintiffs challenging "race-neutral" admissions poli-
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argument regarding the inappropriate use of the LSAT and GPA as
admissions standards has already begun to be litigated. Justice
Thomas noted in his dissent in Grutter that:
The Law School's continued adherence to measures it knows
produce racially skewed results is not entitled to deference...
[because the] Law School itself admits that the test is imperfect . . . . [and an] infinite variety of admissions methods are
available to the Law School. Considering all of the radical
thinking that has historically occurred at this country's universities, the Law Schools' intractable approach toward admissions is striking. °8
If the university has an admissions policy like that of the University of Michigan Law School, in which race is a consideration
in admissions, the student could also seek a declaratory judgment
that the university's race-conscious admissions program should be
expanded. The minority student should argue that race-conscious
admissions programs must be expanded in order to serve not just
as a method of creating diversity in the school's enrollment, but
also as a method of remedying past discrimination and ongoing
racial discrimination in the state education system. °9
Some obvious barriers exist to the success of a lawsuit constructed under these legal theories. First, in regard to the use of
the LSAT and GPA as admissions criteria, while there may be
gaps in LSAT scores and GPAs that correlate with race, these criteria on their face are race-neutral. Also, the advent of the use of
standardized tests and GPA as admissions criteria may not be
traceable to a racially based motive. Therefore, an Equal Protection challenge to these admissions criteria will likely be subject to
rational basis review.2t ° Under rational basis review, courts will
ask only whether the university has a rational basis for employing
cies).
208Grutter V, 123 S. Ct. at 2360-61.
209See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
210Plaintiffs in recent affirmative action cases have also claimed a cause of action under
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Gratz I11, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003). The
analysis of a Title VI violation is identical to analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. See
Grutter V, 123 S. Ct. at 2347 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287
(1978)). Prior to 2001, under regulations promulgated under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, private plaintiffs could challenge governmental actions which had a disparate impact based
on race, national origin, or ethnicity. In 2001, the Supreme Court held that these disparate impact regulations may not be enforced through a private right of action. Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). Therefore, potential minority student plaintiffs will likely not have a
separate Title VI disparate impact challenge to facially neutral admissions criteria. But see
William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates "Built-In Headwinds": An Educational
and Legal Analysis of DisparateImpact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 177 (2002) (describing
a viable disparate impact challenge to the use of standardized tests).
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standardized tests and GPA as admissions criteria. 2 1 The university's obvious justification will be that standardized tests and GPA
are the best predictors for academic success, although not the only
useful predictors. 1 2 Rational basis review is unlikely to allow a
successful constitutional challenge to a university's use of LSATs
and GPAs and admissions criteria would be successful.

2 3

Also,

the Supreme Court's opinion in Grutter makes it clear that universities should be given deference to determine the admissions crite214
ria that best allow the university to meet its institutional goals.
A student seeking a declaratory judgment that a public university's race-conscious admissions program is justified based on past
discrimination will also face difficulties. First, both the district
courts in Grutter and Gratz, the Sixth Circuit in Grutter, and the
Supreme Court in Gratz emphasized the reason for the raceconscious admissions policy given at the time the policy was
adopted.21 5 Therefore, even if the minority plaintiff came forward
with an alternative factual background for the adoption of the raceconscious admissions policy, it is unclear whether a court would
require the university to publicly adopt a specific justification for
the program. The minority plaintiff would likely need to seek a
declaratory judgment that the university should adopt a more expansive race-conscious policy then the policy already in place in
order to remedy the university's past discrimination. A model for
this would be found in desegregation cases in which states were
required by court order or administrative order to adopt affirmative
measures to desegregate a school system.21 6

211See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2495 (2003) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976)) (stating that a facially race-neutral policy with no discriminatory intent is subject to "rational basis" review); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1961 n.65 (2003) (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1964)) (describing rational basis review); James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of
Social Science Evidence in Modern DesegregationCases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1694 (2003)
(stating that a policy which is facially neutral, with no finding of discriminatory intent, will be
subject to rational basis review, which is typically simple to satisfy).
212
See Grutter V, 123 S. Ct. at 2332 (stating that Law School admissions officials must
consider LSAT scores as admissions criteria, because they are "important (if imperfect) predictors of academic success in law school").
213
See sources cited supra note 211; see also Kidder & Rosner, supra note 210, at 173
(2002) (stating that an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the use of standardized tests is
likely a dead end, but describing a viable disparate impact challenge to the use of standardized
tests).
214
See Grutter V, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (stating that the Court's holding is in keeping with the
Court's deference to a university's academic decisions).
215
See sources cited supra notes 174-78.
21
6See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 7-10 (1971); Green
v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
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The advantage to minority students and public interest organizations in abandoning intervention in favor of becoming plaintiffs
is that plaintiffs have expansive rhetorical, narrative advantages. 217
Despite the claim that in public law litigation, intervention provides a method for the protection of third-party interests, the
treatment by the courts of the intervenors in the recent affirmative
action education cases demonstrates that may courts confronted
with public law litigation continue to treat the litigation as a bipolar enterprise. The courts allow the plaintiff and defendant the
powerful narrative tool of shaping the framework of the litigation,
both in evidence and legal arguments. By becoming plaintiffs in
lawsuits against university defendants, minority students would be
able to assume this narrative highground. The courts making decisions in these cases would be forced to confront and engage the
arguments put forth by minority students. Even if ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, the minority students and public interest groups advocating further change in admissions programs
would be practically no worse off than they are today, in the sense
that although the universities would still use LSAT and GPA as
predominant admissions criteria, race-conscious remedies would
also remain in place.
Due to the obvious barriers to successful litigation regarding
admissions criteria, and the use of race-conscious remedies to
remedy past discrimination, other alternatives should be explored
by minority students seeking to gain narrative highground. One
method that has proven to be successful for advocates interested in
transforming admissions policies is the use of legislative alternatives. In Texas, after the Hopwood decision that ended the use of
traditional race-conscious admissions policies, minority legislators
developed an alternative admissions program called the Texas Ten
Percent Plan.2t 8 The Texas Ten Percent Plan allows for students
217

See Lawrence, supra note 152, at 946-47 (arguing that the idea of minorities serving as
plaintiffs in lawsuits against universities regarding admissions policies has strong rhetorical
value by giving voice to a different view of what constitutes equality and justice); see also Kidder & Rosner, supra note 210, at 143 (suggesting a litigation strategy for minority students to
challenge the use of standardized testing).
21

8 LANi GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESIST-

ING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 72 (2002) (recalling the coalition of minority legisla-

tors and their purposes in proposing the Texas Ten Percent Plan); Danielle Holley & Delia
Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 245, 252-60 (describing the
legislative process of adopting the Texas Ten Percent Plan). California and Florida also have
percentage plans that use GPA instead of standardized test scores as the primary criteria for
college admissions. William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A
History of African American, Latino, and Native American Admissions: 1950-2000, 19 HARV.

BLACKLETrER L.J. 1, 29-31 (2003) (detailing the California and Florida percentage plans);
Douglass C. Lawrence, Note, Challenging Affirmative Action: Does Diversity Justify Race-

Conscious Admissions Programs?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 83, 102-04 (2002) (describing the
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graduating in the top ten percent from a Texas high school to be
21 9
automatically admitted to any college or university in the state.
The minority legislators also succeeded in revolutionizing the debate surrounding admissions criteria in general, by shifting the focus of the admissions policy away from standardized testing.22 °
Furthermore, the adoption of the Texas Ten Percent Plan allowed
the legislature to examine the state's higher education system as a
continuation of the state's efforts to create equal quality education
at the elementary and secondary school levels. 22' These goals are
similar to the goals of the students and public interest groups that
have become intervenors in the recent affirmative action education
cases.
Drafting and advocating legislation that would advocate less
reliance on standardized testing as an admissions criteria would
serve as a direct narrative contrast to opponents of race-conscious
remedies who have used ballot initiatives in California and Washington to end the use of race-conscious remedies in those states.2 22
Additionally, legislative action to specifically acknowledge that
the use of race-conscious policies in admissions is justified by the
state's commitment to remedying past discrimination and ending
ongoing segregation in secondary and elementary education echoes
other recent movements by civil rights organizations, such as the
racial reconciliation and reparations movement.

California and Florida percentage plans).
219
See William E. Forbath & Gerald Torres, Merit and Diversity After Hopwood, 10 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 185 (1999) (detailing criteria of the Texas Ten Percent Plan); Holley &
Spencer, supra note 218, at 245 (describing requirements of the Texas Ten Percent Plan).
2
-' See Holley & Spencer, supra note 218, at 260 (arguing that through the adoption of the
Texas Ten Percent Plan, the Texas legislature sought to redefine "merit" as separate from standardized test scores).
221
Charles Lawrence explains:
By treating the top students at each of the state's schools as "most qualified," the University takes responsibility for existing discriminatory conditions in a state where most schools are still racially segregated and unequally financed, training future leaders from oppressed and underserved communities, and challenging the state to make its separate and
unequal schools equal.
Lawrence, supra note 152, at 969; see also Holley & Spencer, supra note 218, at 262 (stating
that the Texas Ten Percent Plan places emphasis on equalizing the quality of secondary school
education because the state is further motivated by the need to prepare students for higher education). But see Michelle Adams, Isn't It Ironic: The Central Paradox at the Heart of "Percentage Plans," 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729 (2001) (asserting that percentage plans diversify higher
education through a continued reliance of segregated elementary and secondary schools).
222
See generally Lawrence, supra note 152, at 952-56 (recounting the California ballot initiative and minority student organization to repeal the anti-affirmative action amendment).
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CONCLUSION

Through intervention, minority students and public interest
groups have sought not only to preserve race-conscious admissions
policies on their merits, but also to gain recognition for their
unique narrative. The minority students' narrative, which presents
race-conscious admissions policies as a method of ending continuing racial inequality and offsetting the negative impact of admissions criteria such as the LSAT, has remained at the margins in
higher education affirmative action litigation. In order for this narrative to gain narrative force, minority students must shift away
from their procedural posture as intervenors towards becoming
plaintiffs in litigation or proponents of legislation that revolutionizes higher education admissions criteria.

